

Rules of [Jewish](gen-jew.html) Hermeneutics

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The Torah is understood and interpreted according to the level being discussed. The Torah can be understood on [four](four.html) levels, while other writings may be confined to only [one](one.html) level. For example, Bereshit (the book of Genesis) can be understood on all [four](four.html) levels, while the [Midrash](orallaw.html) and sefer Matitiyahu (Matthew) can only be understood on the *drash* level. The following chart details these [four](four.html) levels.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **פרדס** | **פשאת** | **רמס** | **דרש** | **סוד** |
| [**PaRDeS**](remez.html) | Pshat | [Remez](remez.html) | Derash | [Sod](sod.html) |
| **Definition** | Simple | Hint | Explore - Ask | [Secret](sod.html) |
| **Literary level** | Grammatical | Allegory | Parabolic | Mystical |
| **Audience level** | Common People | Noble(Lawyers, Judges, Scientists) | Kingly(civil servants, political scientists) | Mystic(psychologists) |
| **Hermeneutic level**[[1]](#footnote-1) | 7 Hillel [Laws](law.html) | 13 Ishmael [Laws](law.html) | 32 Ben Gallil [Laws](law.html) | 42 [Zohar](orallaw.html) [Laws](law.html) |
| **Rabbinic level** | [Mishna](orallaw.html) | [Gemara](orallaw.html) | [Midrash](orallaw.html) | [Zohar](orallaw.html) |
| [**Gospel**](mishna1.html) | Marqos (Mark),1 & 2 Peter | I and II Luqas ([Luke](luke.html)) | Matityahu (Matthew) | Yochanan (John) 1, 2, 3, and Revelation |
| **Presentation** | [HaShem](hashem.html)’s Servant | Son of Man | The King | Son of G-D |
| **Principle Concern** | What do we have to do? | What is the meaning behind what we have to do? | How do we go about establishing [HaShem](hashem.html)'s Kingdom on earth? | What metaphysical meaning is there to what is happening? |
| [**World**](worlds.html) | Asiyah | Yetzirah | Beriyah | Atzilut |
| **Symbol** | Man | Ox/Bull | Lion | Eagle |
| **Mazzaroth** | Deli | Shaur | Aryeh | Aqurav |
| [**Tribe**](tribes.html) | Reuben | Ephraim | Judah | Dan |
| [**Temple**](temple.html) | Outside Chatzer | Chatzer | Kodesh | Kodesh Kodashim |
| [**Purim**](Purim.html) | Mikrah Megillah | Matanot L’Evyonim | Mishloach Manot | Seudas [Purim](Purim.html) |

For a geater explanation for these [four](four.html) levels, look at the [study](study.html) titled: [REMEZ](remez.html). Each of these [four](four.html) levels has its own rules for proper interpretation. The rest of this paper deals with the details of these rules.

# Pshat - The [Thirty](thirty.html)-[two](two.html) Rules of Eliezer B. Jose Ha-Ge-lili[[2]](#footnote-2)

Rules laid down by R. Eliezer b. Jose Ha-Gelili for haggadic exgesis, many of them being applied also to halachic interpretation.

**1. Ribbuy** (extension): The particles “et”, “gam”, and “af”, which are superfluous indicate that something which is not explicitly stated must be regarded as included in the passage under consideration, or that some [teaching](teacher.html) is implied thereby.

**2. Mi’ut** (limitation): The particles “ak”, “rak”, and “min”, indicate that something implied by the concept under consideration must be excluded in a specific case.

**3. Ribbuy ahar ribbuy** (extension after extension): When [one](one.html) extension follows another it indicates that more must be regarded as implied.

**4. Mi’ut ahar mi’ut** (limitation after limitation): A double limitation indicates that more is to be omitted.

**5. Kal va-chomer meforash**: “Argumentum a minori ad majus”, or vice versa, and expressly so characterized in the text.

**6. Kal va-chomer satum**: “Argumentum a minori ad majus” or vice versa, but only implied, not explicitly declared to be [one](one.html) in the text. This and the preceeding rule are contained in the Rules of Hillel [number](nchart.html) 1.

**7.** **Gezerah shawah**: Argument from analagy. Biblical passages containing synonyms or homonyms are subject, however much they differ in other respects, to identical definitions and applications.

**Rashi’s Commentary for: Shemot (Exod.) 34:20 and they shall not appear before Me empty-handed** According to the simple meaning of the verse, this is a separate matter [from the rest of this verse] and is unrelated to the firstborn, because there is no obligation to appear [in the [Temple](temple.html)] in the [commandment](cmds613.html) dealing with the firstborn. Instead this is another warning, [meaning] and when you ascend [to the [Temple](temple.html)] on the [festivals](festivals.html), you shall not appear before Me empty-handed, [but] it is incumbent upon you to bring [burnt offering](korbanot)s (Chag. 7a) whenever appearing before God. According to the way it is interpreted by a Baraitha, this is a superfluous verse [for this was already stated in Exod. 23:15], and it is free [i.e., has no additional reason for being here other than] to be used for a גְּזֵרָה שָׁוָה , [i.e.,] an instance of similar wording, to [teach](teacher.html) [us] about the provisions given a [Hebrew](hebrew.html) slave [when he is freed]—that it is [five](five.html) selas from each kind [i.e., of sheep, grain, and wine], as much as the [redemption](redemption.html) of a firstborn. [This is elaborated upon] in tractate Kiddushin (17a).

**8. Binyan ab mi-katub ehad**: Application of a provision found in [one](one.html) passage only to passages which are related to the [first](one.html) in content but do not contain the provision in question.

**9. Derek Kezarah**: Abbreviation is sometimes used in the text when the subject of discussion is self-explanatory.

**10. Dabar shehu shanuy** (repeated expression): Repitition implies a special meaning.

**11. Siddur she-nehlak**: Where in the text a clause or sentence not logically divisible is divided by the punctuation, the proper order and the division of the verses must be restored according to the logical [connection](connection.html).

**12.** Anything introduced as a comparison to illustrate and explain something else itself receives in this way a better explanation and elucidation.

**13.** When the general is followed by the particular, the latter is specific to the former and merely defines it more exactly. (compare with Hillel #5)

**Rashi on Bereshit (Genesis) 2:8 from the** [**east**](east.html) Heb. מִקֶּדֶם . In the [east](east.html) of Eden, He planted the garden ([Midrash](orallaw.html) Konen). Now if you ask: It has already been stated (above 1:27): “And He created man, etc.!” I saw in the Baraitha of Rabbi Eliezer the son of Rabbi Jose the Galilean concerning the [thirty](thirty.html)-[two](two.html) principles by which the Torah is expounded, and this is [one](one.html) of them [method 13]: A general statement followed by a specific act, the latter constitutes a specific [clarification] of the [first](one.html) [general statement]. “And He created man.” This is a general statement. It left obscure whence he was created, and it left His deeds obscure [i.e., how God created man]. The text repeats and explains: “And the Lord God formed, etc.,” and He made the [Garden of Eden](eden.html) grow for him, and He placed him in the [Garden of Eden](eden.html), and He caused a deep [sleep](mashal.html) to fall upon him. The listener may think that this is another story, but it is only the detailed account of the former. Likewise, in the case of the animal, Scripture repeats and writes (below verse 19): “And the Lord God formed from the ground all the beasts of the field,” in order to explain, “and He brought [them] to man” to [name](name.html) them, and to [teach](teacher.html) about the fowl, that they were created from the mud.

**14.** Something important is compared with something unimportant to elucidate it and render it more readily intelligible.

**15.** When [two](two.html) Biblical passages contradict each other the contradiction in question must be solved by reference to a [third](three.html) passage.

**16.** Dabar meyuhad bi-mekomo: An expression which occurs in only [one](one.html) passage can be explained only by the context. This must have been the original meaning of the rule, although another explanation is given in the examples cited in the baraita.

**17.** A point which is not clearly explained in the main passage may be better elucidated in another passage.

**18.** A statement with regard to a part may imply the whole.

**19.** A statement concerning [one](one.html) thing may hold good with regard to another as well.

**20.** A stetment concerning [one](one.html) thing may apply only to something else.

**21.** If [one](one.html) object is compared to [two](two.html) other objects the best part of both the latter forms the tertium quid of comparison.

**22.** A passage may be supplemented and explained by a parallel passage.

**23.** A passage serves to elucidate and supplement its parallel passage.

**24.** When the specific implied in the general is especially excepted from the general, it serves to emphasize some property characterizing the specific.

**25.** The specific implied in the general is frequently excepted from the general to elucidate some other specific property, and to develop some special [teaching](teacher.html) concerning it.

**26.** [**Mashal**](mashal.html) (parable).

**27. Mi-ma’al**: Interpretation through the preceding.

**28. Mi-neged**: Interpretation through the opposite.

**29. Gematria**: Interpretation according to the numerical value of the [letters](letters.html).

**30. Notarikon**: Interpretation by dividing a word into [two](two.html) or more parts.

**31.** Postposition of the precedent. Many phraes which follow must be regarded as properly preceding, and must be interpreted accordingly in exegesis.

**32.** May portions of the Bible refer to an earlier period than to the sections which precede them, and vice versa.

These [thirty](thirty.html)-[two](two.html) rules are united in the so-called Baraita of R. Eliezer b. Jose HaGelili. In the introduction to the [Midrash](orallaw.html) ha-Gadole, where this baraita is given, it contains [thirty](thirty.html)-[three](three.html) rules. Rule 29 being divided into [three](three.html), and rule 27 being omitted.

# [Remez](remez.html) - The [Seven](seven.html) Rules of Hillel[[3]](#footnote-3)

**1**. **Kal Va-Chomer**:

Argument that reasons: If a rule or fact applies in a situation where there is relatively little reason for it to apply, certainly it applies in a situation where there is more reason for it to apply. For example, in the verse: Moses says, “If [Israel](gen-jew.html), for whom my message is beneficial, will not listen to me, certainly Pharaoh, for whom the message is detrimental, will not listen” (Mizrachi; Sifsei Chachamim).

Another reason that Pharaoh would not listen is because Moses was “of blocked lips”, and it is unbefitting that [one](one.html) with a speech defect should [speak](mashal.html) before the king. However, to the general populace such an impediment is not significant. So, if the Israelites who should not have demurred because of Moses’ blocked lips, nevertheless ignored him, certainly Pharaoh, who was unused to such speech, would reject his message. Thus, the statement, “I am of blocked lips”, is part of the val vachomer. And it is to emphasize this that Rashi commented on “blocked lips” before “So how will Pharaoh listen to me?” (Gur Aryeh)

[**Midrash**](orallaw.html) **Rabbah - Genesis XCII:7** AND WHEN THEY WERE GONE OUT OF THE [CITY](city.html)... IS NOT THIS IT IN WHICH MY LORD DRINKETH... AND HE OVERTOOK THEM... AND THEY SAID UNTO HIM:... BEHOLD, THE MONEY, etc. (XLIV, 4-8). R. Ishmael [taught](teacher.html): This is [one](one.html) of the [**ten**](ten.html) **a fortiori arguments** recorded in the Torah. (i) BEHOLD, THE MONEY, WHICH WE FOUND IN OUR SACKS’ [MOUTHS](body.html), WE BROUGHT BACK UNTO THEE; does it then not stand to reason, How THEN SHOULD WE STEAL, etc. (ii) Behold, the children of [Israel](gen-jew.html) have not hearkened unto me; surely all the more, How then shall Pharaoh hear me (Ex. VI, 12). (iii) Behold, while I am yet alive with you this day, ye have been rebellious against the Lord; does it not follow then, And how much more after my death (Deut. XXXI, 27). (iv) And the Lord said unto Moses: If her father had but spit in her [face](body.html); surely it would stand to reason, Should she not hide in shame [seven](seven.html) days Num. XII, 14). (v) If thou hast run with the footmen, and they have wearied thee, is it not logical to say, Then how canst thou contend with horses (Jer. XII, 5). (vi) Behold, we are afraid here in Judah; surely it stands to reason, How much more then if we go to Keilah (I Sam. XXIII, 3). (vii) And if in a land of Peace where thou art secure [thou art overcome], is it not logical to ask, How wilt thou do in the thickets of the [Jordan](stages.html)? Jer. loc. cit.). (viii) Behold, the righteous shall be requited in the earth; does it not follow, How much more the [wicked](wicked.html) and the sinner (Prov. XI, 31). (ix) And the king said unto [Esther](esther.html) the queen: The [Jews](gen-jew.html) have slain and destroyed [five](five.html) hundred men in Shushan the castle; it stands to reason, What then have they done in the rest of the king's provinces (Est. IX, 12). (x) Behold, when it was whole, it was meet for no work; surely it is logical to argue, How much less, when the [fire](fire.html) hath devoured it, and it is singed, etc. (Ezek. XV, 5).)

**Rashi’s Commentary for: ‎ D’barim (Deut.) 32:46 Set your hearts** A person must direct his [eyes](body.html), his [heart](body.html), and his [ears](body.html) to the words of the Torah, for Scripture states (Ezek. 40:4),"Son of man, see with your [eyes](body.html), and listen with your [ears](body.html), and set your [heart](body.html) [upon all that I show you]" [namely, the plan of the Holy [Temple](temple.html)]. **Now, here, we have an inference from major to minor: If in the case of the plan of the Holy** [**Temple**](temple.html)**, which is visible to the** [**eyes**](body.html) **and which is measured with a measuring-**[**rod**](staff.html)**, a person must direct his** [**eyes**](body.html)**,** [**ears**](body.html)**, and** [**heart**](body.html) **to understand, how much more so must he do so to understand the words of the Torah, which are likened to “mountains suspended by a** [**hair**](hair.html)**” [i.e., numerous** [**laws**](law.html) **derived from a single word of the Torah]?![[4]](#footnote-4)**

There are [ten](ten.html) val chomer arguments, enumerated in Bereshit Rabbah 92:7, that appear in Torah, as cited by Rashi:

Genesis 44:8

[Exodus](exodus.html) 6:12

[Numbers](nchart.html) 12:14

Deuteronomy 31:27

I Samuel 23:3

Jeremiah 12:5 (2 arguments)

Ezekiel 15:5

Proverbs 11:31

[Esther](esther.html) 9:12

**2.** **Gezerah shawah**:

Argument from analagy. Biblical passages containing synonyms or homonyms are subject, however much they differ in other respects, to identical definitions and applications.

**3. Binyan ab mi-katub ehad**: Application of a provision found in [one](one.html) passage only to passages which are related to the [first](one.html) in content but do not contain the provision in question.

**4. Binyan ab mi-shene ketubim**: The same as the preceeding except that the provision is generalized from [two](two.html) Biblical passages.

**5. Kelal u-Perat** and **Perat u-kelal**: Definition of the general by the particular, and of the particular, and of the particular by the general.

**6. Ka-yoze bo mi-makon aher**: Similarity in context to another scriptural passage.

**7. Dabar ha-lamed me-‘inyano**: Interpretation deduced from the context.

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# Drash - The [Thirteen](thirteen.html) rules of Rabbi Ishmael

[Thirteen](thirteen.html) rules compiled by Rabbi Ishmael b. Elisha for the elucidation of the Torah and for making halachic deductions from it. They are, strictly [speaking](mashal.html), mere amplifications of the [seven](seven.html) rules of Hillel, and are collected in the Baraita of R. Ishmael, forming the introduction to the Sifra and reading as follows:

**1**. **Kal VaChomer**: *From a lenient* [*law*](law.html) *to a strict* [*law*](law.html)*.* (Identical with the [first](one.html) rule of Hillel.)

A kal vachomer is an a fortiori logical argument that reasons: If a rule or fact applies in a situation where there is relatively little reason for it to apply, certainly it applies in a situation where there is more reason for it to apply. For example, in the verse: Moses says, “If [Israel](gen-jew.html), for whom my message is beneficial, will not listen to me, certainly Pharaoh, for whom the message is detrimental, will not listen”.[[5]](#footnote-5)

Another reason that Pharaoh would not listen is because Moses was “of blocked lips”, and it is unbefitting that [one](one.html) with a speech defect should [speak](mashal.html) before the king. However, to the general populace such an impediment is not significant. So, if the Israelites who should not have demurred because of Moses’ blocked lips, nevertheless ignored him, certainly Pharaoh, who was unused to such speech, would reject his message. Thus, the statement, “I am of blocked lips”, is part of the val vachomer. And it is to emphasize this that Rashi commented on “blocked lips” before “So how will Pharaoh listen to me?” [[6]](#footnote-6)

If, for example, a certain act is forbidden on an ordinary [festival](festival.html), it is so much more forbidden on Yom [HaKippurim](kippur.html). If a certain act is permissable on Yom [HaKippurim](kippur.html), it is so much more permissable on an ordinary [festival](festival.html).

If a tamid [offering](korbanot) may be offered on [Shabbat](sabbath.html), even though if it is not brought there is no punishment of *keret* (a divine punishment of premature death) involved, then certainally the [Pesach](passover.html) [offering](korbanot) may be offered on [Shabbat](sabbath.html), since if it is not brought there is a punishment of *keret* involved.

If it is forbidden to pluck an apple from a tree on [festivals](festivals.html) (when [food](food.html) may be prepared by cooking and other means that may be prohibited on [Shabbat](sabbath.html)), surely plucking is forbidden on [Shabbat](sabbath.html). Conversely, if it is permitted to slice vegetables on [Shabbat](sabbath.html), it is surely permitted on the [festivals](festivals.html).

The reverse is also true, if a lenient ruling applies to a stringent [law](law.html), then certainally that lenient ruling applies to a lenient [law](law.html).

Rashi uses Devarim (Deuteronomy) 14:8 to illustrate this:

**8 nor touch their carcass** Our Rabbis explained [that this refers only to] the [Festival](festival.html)[s], for a person is obliged to [purify](purity.html) himself for the [Festival](festival.html). [One](one.html) might think that [all Israelites] are prohibited [from touching a carcass] during the entire year. Therefore, Scripture states [in reference to the uncleanness of a corpse], “Say to the [kohanim](priests.html)... [none shall be defiled for the dead...]” (Lev. 21:1). Now if in the case of the uncleanness caused by a [human] corpse, which is a stringent [kind of uncleanness, only] [kohanim](priests.html) are prohibited regarding it but [ordinary] Israelites are not prohibited, then in the case of uncleanness caused by a carcass [of an animal], which is light [i.e., a less stringent uncleanness], how much more so [is the case that ordinary Israelites are permitted to touch these carcasses]!

Rashi, on Bamidbar ([Numbers](nchart.html)) 12:14, says: **14 If her father were to spit in her** [**face**](body.html) If her father had turned to her with an angry [face](body.html), would she not be humiliated for [seven](seven.html) days? All the more so in the case of the Divine Presence [she should be humiliated for] [fourteen](fourteen.html) days! But [there is a rule that] it is sufficient that a [law](law.html) derived from an afortiori conclusion to be only as stringent as the [law](law.html) from which it is derived. Thus, even as a consequence of My reprimand, she should be confined [only] [seven](seven.html) days.-[Sifrei Beha’alothecha 1:42:14, B.K. 25a]

**2.** **Gezerah shavah**: *From a similarity of words.* (Identical with the second rule of Hillel.)

Argument from analagy. Biblical passages containing synonyms or homonyms are subject, however much they differ in other respects, to identical definitions and applications.

If a similar word or expression occurs in [two](two.html) places in scripture, the rulings of each place may be applied to the other. “Similar words” cannot be original; it must be passed from master to disciple, originating with Moshe to whom [HaShem](hashem.html) [taught](teacher.html) at Mount [Sinai](stages.html).

In strictly limited cases, the Sinaitic tradition [teaches](teacher.html) that the [two](two.html) independent [laws](law.html) or cases are meant to shed light upon [one](one.html) another. The indication that the [two](two.html) [laws](law.html) are complementary can be seen in [two](two.html) ways: (a) The same or similar words appear in both cases, e.g. the word *in its proper* [*time*](time.html),[[7]](#footnote-7) is understood to indicate that the daily [offering](korbanot) must be brought even on [Shabbat](sabbath.html). Similarly, the same word in the context of the [Pesach](passover.html) [offering](korbanot)[[8]](#footnote-8) should be interpreted to mean that it is offered even if its [appointed](settimes.html) day, too, falls on [Shabbat](sabbath.html)[[9]](#footnote-9) When [two](two.html) different topics are placed next to [one](one.html) another (this is also called *comparison*), e.g. many [laws](law.html) regarding the technical process of divorce and [betrothal](betroth.html) are derived from [one](one.html) another because Scripture[[10]](#footnote-10) mentions divorce and [betrothal](betroth.html) in the same phrase by saying, *she shall depart* [through divorce] *and become betrothed to another man*. This juxtaposition iumplies that the [two](two.html) changes of marital status are accomplished through similar legal processes.[[11]](#footnote-11)

The phrase ‘[Hebrew](hebrew.html) slave”[[12]](#footnote-12) is ambiguous, for it may mean a heathen slave owned by a [Hebrew](hebrew.html), or else, a slave who is a [Hebrew](hebrew.html). That the latter is the correct meaning is proved by a reference to the phrase “your [Hebrew](hebrew.html) brother”[[13]](#footnote-13), where the same [law](law.html) is mentioned (… If your [Hebrew](hebrew.html) brother is sold to you …).

**Rashi’s Commentary for: Vayiqra (Leviticus) 13:55: the worn** Heb. בְּקָרַחְתּוֹ. Old, worn out garments, and because of the midrashic explanation, that this language is necessary for a גְּזֵרָה שָׁוָה here [i.e., a link between [two](two.html) seemingly unrelated passages through common terms, thereby inferring the [laws](law.html) of [one](one.html) passage from the [laws](law.html) of the other, as follows]: How do we [know](daat.html) that if a lesion on a garment spreads [throughout the entire garment], it is [clean](purity.html)? Because [Scripture] states קָרַחַת and גַּבַּחַת in the context of [lesions that appear on] man (verse 42), and here, in the context of [lesion on] garments, [Scripture] also states קָרַחַת and גַּבַּחַת ; just as there [in the case of lesions on man], if it spread over the entire [body](body.html), he is [clean](purity.html) (verses 1213), so too, here, [in the case of lesion on garments,] if it spread over the entire garment, it is [clean](purity.html) (*San.* 88a), Scripture adopts the [unusual] expressions קָרַחַת and גַּבַּחַת. However, concerning the explanation and translation [of these terms], the simple meaning is that קָרַחַת means “old” and גַּבַּחַת means “[new](new.html).” It is as though it were written, “[It is a lesion on] its end or its beginning,” for קָרַחַת means “back” [i.e., at the end of the garment’s life, when it is old,] and גַּבַּחַת means “front” [i.e., the beginning of its life, when it is [new](new.html)]. This is just as is written, “And if [he loses [hair](hair.html)] at the front of his [head](body.html), [he is bald at the front (גַּבַּח)]” (verse 41). And קָרַחַתrefers from the crown toward his back. Thus it is explained in *Torath* [*Kohanim*](priests.html) (13: 144).

**3. Binyan Ab**: *From a general principle found in* [*one*](one.html) *verse, or from a general principle found in* [*two*](two.html) *verses.* (This rule is a combination of the [third](three.html) and [fourth](four.html) rules of Hillel.)

Rules deduced from a single passaage of Scripture and rules deduced from [two](two.html) passages.

The Torah [teaches](teacher.html) that work in preparation of [food](food.html) is permitted on [Pesach](passover.html). We extend this ruling to apply to other holidays as well.

Where [one](one.html) verse may not be sufficient to apply its rule elsewhere, a combination of [two](two.html) verses might be. For example: The Torah holds the owner of an ox liable for the damages caused by the ox. This ruling applies even if the damages it inflicts occurred somewhere other than where the owner originally placed the ox. Similarly, [one](one.html) is liable for the damages caused by a pit he dug, or by an inanimate obstacle he placed in a public domain. From the combination of these [two](two.html) [laws](law.html) we derive a [third](three.html) [law](law.html) that if a person places an *obstacle* in the public domain and it caused damage somewhere other than where it was originally placed, the person who originally put it down is liable. See Bava Kama 6a.

From Devarim 24:6 (“No [one](one.html) shall take a handmill or an upper millstone in pledge, for he would be taking a life in pledge”) the Rabbis concluded: “Everything which is used for preparing [food](food.html) is forbidden to be taken in pledge”.

From Shemot 21:26-27 (“If a man strikes the eye of his slave … and destroys it, he must let him go free in compensation for his eye. If he knocks out the tooth of his slave … he must let him go free…”) the Hakhamim concluded that when *any* part of the slave’s [body](body.html) is mutilated by the master, the slave shall go free.

Since the Torah specifies that [one](one.html) may not marry even his maternal half sister, this general principle, dictates that the prohhibition against marrying ones father’s sister applies equally to his father’s maternal half sister.[[14]](#footnote-14) the same rule applies when [two](two.html) different verses shed light on [one](one.html) another: Similar situations may be derived from the combination of the [two](two.html) verses.

\* \* \*

Let’s continue with the word “[grace](grace.html)” (חןֵ) appearing in parashat Ki Tisa. In the [Third](three.html) Aliyah ([Exodus](exodus.html) 33:12-16), Moshe Rabbeinu asks [HaShem](hashem.html) to show him his ways. There are 82 words in this parshiyah. It is after the [sin](sin.html) of the Golden Calf. In these 82 words, Moshe asks [four](four.html) times, “If I have found favor in your [eyes](body.html)”. This is the highest concentrations of the word “[grace](grace.html)”, or “favor” in the Tanach. This is the source for our method of counting the location of words in a paragraph or in a verse. This is the *binyan* [*av*](feasts.html) for this method, and when you see it once very strongly, from then on you believe that the Torah has this in mind.

**4. Kelal uPerat**: *From a generality followed by a specific.*

The general and the particular.

In **Vayikra (Leviticus) (Leviticus) 18:6** the [law](law.html) reads: “None of you shall marry anyone related to him”. This generalization is followed by a specification of forbidden marriages. Hence, this prohibition applies only to those expressly mentioned.

The Torah writes,[[15]](#footnote-15) *If a person shall offer a* [*sacrifice*](korbanot.html) *to* [*HaShem*](hashem.html) *of an animal, etc*. The generalization *of an animal* would seem to include any and all animals. However, Scripture follows that phrase with, *from cattle or sheep*, thereby specifying that only cattle and sheep are fit to be brought as offerings.

**Rashi’s Commentary on D’barim (Deuteronomy) 15:21** **[And if there be any] blemish [in it]** [This is] a כְּלָל, a general statement [not limiting itself to anything in particular].

**lame, or blind** [This is] a פְּרָט, particular things, [limiting the matter to these things].

**any ill blemish** [Once again the verse] reverts to כְּלָל, a general statement. [Now we have learned that when a verse expresses a כְּלָל, then a פְּרָט, and then a כְּלָלagain, just as in this case, we apply the characteristics of the פְּרָט to the whole matter.] Just as the blemishes detailed [lame or blind] are externally visible blemishes that do not heal, so too, any externally visible blemish that does not heal [renders a firstborn animal unfit for [sacrifice](korbanot.html) and may be [eaten](eating.html) as ordinary flesh].-[*Bech.* 37a]

**Rashi’s Commentary on D’barim (Deuteronomy) 16:8** **For** [**six**](six.html) **days you shall** [**eat**](eating.html) **matzoth** But elsewhere it says, “For [*seven*](seven.html) days [you shall [eat](eating.html) *matzoth*]!” (Exod. 12:15). [The solution is:] For [seven](seven.html) days you shall [eat](eating.html) *matzoth* from the old [produce] and [six](six.html) days [i.e., the last [six](six.html) days, after the [*omer*](omer.html) has been offered] you may [eat](eating.html) *matzoth* prepared from the [new](new.html) [crop]. Another explanation: It [teaches](teacher.html) that the [eating](eating.html) of *matzoh*on the [seventh](seven.html) day of [Passover](passover.html) is not obligatory, and from here you learn [that the same [law](law.html) applies] to the other [six](six.html) days [of the [Festival](festival.html)], For the [seventh](seven.html) day was included in a general statement [in the verse “For [seven](seven.html) days you shall [eat](eating.html) *matzoth*,” but in the verse: “[Six](six.html) days you shall [eat](eating.html) *matzoth* ”] it has been taken out of this general [statement], to [teach](teacher.html) us that [eating](eating.html) *matzoh* [on the [seventh](seven.html) day] is not obligatory, but optional. [Now we have aready learned that if something is singled out of a general statement, we apply the relevant principle not only to itself but to every thing included in the general category. Thus the [seventh](seven.html) day] is excluded here not to [teach](teacher.html) regarding itself, rather to [teach](teacher.html) regarding the entire generalization [i.e., the entire [seven](seven.html) days of the [Festival](festival.html)]. Just as on the [seventh](seven.html) day the [eating](eating.html) of [*matzah*](chametz.html) is optional, so too, on all the other days, the [eating](eating.html) of [*matzah*](chametz.html) is optional. The only exception is the [first](one.html) night [of [Passover](passover.html)], which Scripture has explicitly established as obligatory, as it is said, “in the evening, you shall [eat](eating.html) *matzoth* ” (Exod. 12:18). -[*Mechilta* on Exod 12:18; *Pes.* 120a]

**5. uPerat ukelal**: *From a specific followed by a generality*.

The particular and the general.

In Shemot 22:9 we read: “If a man gives to his neighbor an [ass](chamor.html), an ox, or a sheep, to keep, or any animal, and it dies...”. The general phrase “any animal”, which follows the specification, includes is this [law](law.html) all kinds of animals.

Regarding the [mitzva](cmds613.html) of *returning a lost article*, the Torah writes[[16]](#footnote-16) *so shall you do for his* [*donkey*](chamor.html) *and so shall you do for his garment*. [One](one.html) might conclude that the [mitzva](cmds613.html) applies only to these items. The Torah therefore follows that phrase with *so shall you do regarding any lost article of your brother*, thereby including all lost aticles in the [mitzva](cmds613.html).

**6. Kelal uPerat ukelal (**The general, the particular, and the general**)**: *When a generality is followed by a specific and a generality, you may infer only that which is similar to the specific*.

In Shemot 22:8 we are told that an embezzler shall pay double to his neighbor “for anything embezzled [generalization], for ox, or [ass](chamor.html), or sheep, or clothing [specification], or any article lost [generalization]. Since the specification includes only moveable property, and objects of intrinsic value, the fine of double payment does not apply to embezzled real estate, not to notes and bills since the latter represents only a symbolic value.

**Devarim (Deuteronomy) 14:26** Other things than those specified in Devarim 14:26 may be purchased, but only if they are [food](food.html) or drink like those specified.

As an example, Rashi says:

**Devarim (Deuteronomy) 14:26 [And you will turn that money] into whatever your soul** [**desires**](needs.html) This is a כְּלָל , a general statement [not limited to anything in particular. Whereas the next expression,]

**cattle, or sheep,** [**new**](new.html) **wine or old wine** [represents a] פְּרָט , a “specification” [that is, it details particular things, limiting the matter to those things. After this, the verse continues,]

**or whatever your soul** [**desires**](needs.html)[The verse] again reverts to a כְּלָל , a “general statement.” [Now we have learned that when a verse expresses a כְּלָל , a פְּרָט , and then a כְּלָל again, as in this case, we apply the characteristics of the פְּרָט to the whole matter. That is,] just as the items listed in the פְּרָט 1) are products of things themselves produced by the earth [e.g., wine comes from grapes], and 2) are fitting to be [food](food.html) for man, [so must the money replacing them be used to purchase such products].-[Eruvin 27a]

Another example, Rashi says:

**Devarim (Deuteronomy) 14:26 [And you will turn that money] into whatever your soul** [**desires**](needs.html) This is a כְּלָל , a general statement [not limited to anything in particular. Whereas the next expression,]

**cattle, or sheep,** [**new**](new.html) **wine or old wine** [represents a] פְּרָט , a “specification” [that is, it details particular things, limiting the matter to those things. After this, the verse continues,]

**or whatever your soul** [**desires**](needs.html)[The verse] again reverts to a כְּלָל , a “general statement.” [Now we have learned that when a verse expresses a כְּלָל , a פְּרָט , and then a כְּלָל again, as in this case, we apply the characteristics of the פְּרָט to the whole matter. That is,] just as the items listed in the פְּרָט 1) are products of things themselves produced by the earth [e.g., wine comes from grapes], and 2) are fitting to be [food](food.html) for man, [so must the money replacing them be used to purchase such products].-[Eruvin 27a]

Another example, Rashi says:

**Devarim (Deuteronomy) 15:21** **[And if there be any] blemish [in it]** [This is] a כְּלָל, a general statement [not limiting itself to anything in particular].

**lame, or blind** [This is] a פְּרָט, particular things, [limiting the matter to these things].

**any ill blemish** [Once again the verse] reverts to כְּלָל, a general statement. [Now we have learned that when a verse expresses a כְּלָל, then a פְּרָט, and then a כְּלָל again, just as in this case, we apply the characteristics of the פְּרָט to the whole matter.] Just as the blemishes detailed [lame or blind] are externally visible blemishes that do not heal, so too, any externally visible blemish that does not heal [renders a firstborn animal unfit for [sacrifice](korbanot.html) and may be [eaten](eating.html) as ordinary flesh].-[*Bech.* 37a]

Another example, Rashi says:

**Devarim 16:8** **For** [**six**](six.html) **days you shall** [**eat**](eating.html) **matzoth** But elsewhere it says, “For [*seven*](seven.html) days [you shall [eat](eating.html) *matzoth*]!” (Exod. 12:15). [The solution is:] For [seven](seven.html) days you shall [eat](eating.html) *matzoth* from the old [produce] and [six](six.html) days [i.e., the last [six](six.html) days, after the [*omer*](omer.html) has been offered] you may [eat](eating.html) *matzoth* prepared from the [new](new.html) [crop]. Another explanation: It [teaches](teacher.html) that the [eating](eating.html) of *matzoh* on the [seventh](seven.html) day of [Passover](passover.html) is not obligatory, and from here you learn [that the same [law](law.html) applies] to the other [six](six.html) days [of the [Festival](festival.html)], For the [seventh](seven.html) day was included in a general statement [in the verse “For [seven](seven.html) days you shall [eat](eating.html) *matzoth*,” but in the verse: “[Six](six.html) days you shall [eat](eating.html) *matzoth* ”] it has been taken out of this general [statement], to [teach](teacher.html) us that [eating](eating.html) *matzoh* [on the [seventh](seven.html) day] is not obligatory, but optional. [Now we have aready learned that if something is singled out of a general statement, we apply the relevant principle not only to itself but to every thing included in the general category. Thus the [seventh](seven.html) day] is excluded here not to [teach](teacher.html) regarding itself, rather to [teach](teacher.html) regarding the entire generalization [i.e., the entire [seven](seven.html) days of the [Festival](festival.html)]. Just as on the [seventh](seven.html) day the [eating](eating.html) of [*matzah*](chametz.html) is optional, so too, on all the other days, the [eating](eating.html) of [*matzah*](chametz.html) is optional. The only exception is the [first](one.html) night [of [Passover](passover.html)], which Scripture has explicitly established as obligatory, as it is said, “in the evening, you shall [eat](eating.html) *matzoth* ” (Exod. 12:18). -[*Mechilta* on Exod 12:18; *Pes.* 120a]

**7.** **kelal shehu tzerik lefrat**: *From a generality that requires an explanatory specific, and from a specific that requires an explanatory generality*.

The general which requires elucidation by the particular, and the particular which requires elucidation by the general.

The Torah writes[[17]](#footnote-17) *Sanctify to me any firstborn*, which implies that even a [female](male%2Bfemale.html) firstborn would be included in this [law](law.html). The Torah therefore explicitly states that included in this [law](law.html) are only *males* (v.12). The previous employs derivation method #4; what follows employs method #7, see Rashi to tractate Bechorot 19a. However, [one](one.html) might still think that a firstborn [male](male%2Bfemale.html), even if preceded by females, is to be sanctified. The Torah therefore says (v.2) *the* [*first*](one.html) *to leave the* [*womb*](thebirth.html). However, [one](one.html) might still think that if a [male](male%2Bfemale.html) is the [first](one.html) to leave the [womb](thebirth.html), even if it was preceded by [one](one.html) born by caesarean section, it is to be sanctified. The verse therefore states: *Firstborn*. Thus, it must be a [male](male%2Bfemale.html) *and* the absolute firstborn if it is to be sanctified. Hence, we have an illustration of a generality (*firstborn*) that requires a specific (*the* [*first*](one.html) *to leave the* [*womb*](thebirth.html)) to define it, and vice versa.

In Vayikra (Leviticus) (Leviticus) 17:13 we read: “He shall pour out its [blood](body.html) and cover it with [dust](rock.html)”. The verb “to cover” is a general term, since there are various ways of covering a thing; “with [dust](rock.html)” is specific. If we were to apply rule [four](four.html) to this passage, the [law](law.html) would be that the [blood](body.html) of the slaughtered animal must be covered with nothing except duct. Since, however, the general term “to cover” may also mean “to hide”, our present passage necessarily requires the specific expression “with [dust](rock.html)”; otherwise the [law](law.html) might be interpreted to mean the [blood](body.html) is to be concealed in a closed vessle. On the other [hand](fourteen.html), the specification “with [dust](rock.html)” without the general expression “to cover” would be meaningless.

**8.** *Anything that was part of a general principle and was later singled out from the general principle to* [*teach*](teacher.html) *[a specific piece of information], it is not to* [*teach*](teacher.html) *[this information] only about itself that it was singled out, but to* [*teach*](teacher.html) *[this information] regarding the entire general principle was it singled out.*

The particular implied in the general and excepted from it for pedagogic purposes elucidates the general as well as the particular.

The Torah writes,[[18]](#footnote-18) *Do not kindle a* [*fire*](fire.html) *in all your habitation on the* [*Shabbat*](sabbath.html) *day*. Now kindling is included in the general category of *work prohibited on* [*Shabbat*](sabbath.html). Why then is it singled out with its own verse? It is singled out in order to compare the other *to kindling*, that just as when [one](one.html) kindles on [Shabbat](sabbath.html) unintentionally he must bring *a* [*sin*](sin.html)[*offering*](korbanot) as [atonement](atonemen.html) for that [one](one.html) action, so, if [one](one.html) performes several labors prohibited on [Shabbat](sabbath.html) unintentionally, he is required to bring a separate [*sin*](sin.html)[*offering*](korbanot) for each and every [one](one.html). Hence, the specific [law](law.html) [teaches](teacher.html) something with regard to the general [law](law.html).

In Devarim (Deuteronomy) 22:1 we are told that the finder of lost property must return it to its owner. In the next verse the Torah adds: “You shall do the same … with his *garment* and with anything lost by your brother… which you have found …”. Garment, though included in the general expression “anything lost”, is specifically mentioned in order to indicate that the duty to announce the finding of lost articles applies only to such objects which are likely to have an owner, and which have, as in the case of clothing, some marks by which they can be identified.

The Torah[[19]](#footnote-19) forbids the [eating](eating.html) of sacrificial meat by anyone who is *ritually contaminated*. The very next verse singles out the peace-[offering](korbanot), and states that a contaminated person who [eats](eating.html) of it is liable to keret, [spiritual](physical.html) excision. This principle [teaches](teacher.html) that the peace-[offering](korbanot) is not an exception to the the general rule; rather that the punishment specified for the peace-[offering](korbanot) applies to all offerings.

"A man, also, or a woman that devines that by a ghost or a familiar spirit, shall surel be put to death; they shall stone them with stones"[[20]](#footnote-20) Divination by a ghost or a familiar spirit is included in the general rule against witchcraft.[[21]](#footnote-21) Since the penalty in Vayikra (Leviticus) 20:27 is stoneing it may be inferred that the same penalty applies to other instasnces within the same general rule.[[22]](#footnote-22)

Rashi, in his commentary for: ‎ Shemot ([Exodus](exodus.html)) 12:15, provides us with another example of this principle:

**Shemot (**[**Exodus**](exodus.html)**) 12:15** For [seven](seven.html) days-Heb. שִׁבְעַת יָמִים , seteyne of days, i.e., a group of [seven](seven.html) days.[[23]](#footnote-23)

For [seven](seven.html) days you shall [eat](eating.html) [unleavened](chametz.html) cakes- But elsewhere it says: “For [six](six.html) days you shall [eat](eating.html) [unleavened](chametz.html) cakes”.[[24]](#footnote-24) This [teaches](teacher.html) [us] regarding the [seventh](seven.html) day of [Passover](passover.html), that it is not obligatory to [eat](eating.html) [matzah](chametz.html), as long as [one](one.html) does not [eat](eating.html) [chametz](chametz.html). How do we [know](daat.html) that [the [first](one.html)] [six](six.html) [days] are also optional [concerning [eating](eating.html) [matzah](chametz.html)]? This is a principle in [interpreting] the Torah: Anything that was included in a generalization [in the Torah] and was excluded from that generalization [in the Torah] to [teach](teacher.html) [something] it was not excluded to [teach](teacher.html) [only] about itself, but it was excluded to [teach](teacher.html) about the entire generalization. [In this case it means that] just as [on] the [seventh](seven.html) day [[eating](eating.html) [matzah](chametz.html)] is optional, so is it optional in [the [first](one.html)] [six](six.html) [days]. I might think that [on] the [first](one.html) night it is also optional. Therefore, Scripture states: “in the evening, you shall [eat](eating.html) [unleavened](chametz.html) cakes”.[[25]](#footnote-25) The text established it as an obligation.[[26]](#footnote-26)

but on the preceding day you shall clear away all [leaven](chametz.html)-Heb. בַּיוֹם הָרִאשׁוֹן . On the day before the [holiday](festival.html); it is called the [first](one.html) [day], because it is before the [seven](seven.html); [i.e., it is not the [first](one.html) of the [seven](seven.html) days]. Indeed, we find [anything that is] the preceding [one](one.html) [is] called רִאשׁוֹן , e.g.,הֲרִאשׁוֹן אָדָם תִּוָלֵד , “Were you born before [Adam](adam.html)?”.[[27]](#footnote-27) Or perhaps it means only the [first](one.html) of the [seven](seven.html) [days of [Passover](passover.html)]. Therefore, Scripture states: “You shall not slaughter with [leaven](chametz.html) [the [blood](body.html) of My [sacrifice](korbanot.html)]”.[[28]](#footnote-28) You shall not slaughter the [Passover](passover.html) [sacrifice](korbanot.html) as long as the [leaven](chametz.html) still exists.[[29]](#footnote-29) [Since the [Passover](passover.html) [sacrifice](korbanot.html) may be slaughtered immediately after noon on the [fourteenth](fourteen.html) day of Nissan, clearly the [leaven](chametz.html) must be removed before that [time](time.html). Hence the expression בַּיוֹם הָרִאשׁוֹן must refer to the day preceding the [festival](festival.html).]

**9.** *Anything that was part of a general principle and was later singled out to discuss another point similar to [the general principle] was singled out in order to be more lenient, but not to be more stingent.*

The particular implied in the general and excepted from it on account of the special regulation which corresponds in concept to the general, is thus isolated to decrease rather than to increase the rigidity of its application.

The Torah says[[30]](#footnote-30) [*One*](one.html) *who kills a person shall be put to death*. This verse would seem to mandate the death penalty both for [one](one.html) who kills intentionally and also for [one](one.html) who kills unintentionally. The Torah then writes (v.13) that if [one](one.html) kills another person *unintentionally*, he is not put to death; rather, he is [exiled](galuyot.html) to [one](one.html) of the [cities of refuge](elul.html) (Devarim 19:5), [One](one.html) who kills unintentionally is thereby singled out from the general principle of [*one*](one.html) *who kills a person shall be put to death*, to indicate that his punishment is more *lenient*, and he is *not* subject to death, merely to [exile](galuyot.html).

In Shemot 35:2-3 we read: “Whoever does any work on the [Sabbath](sabbath.html) shall be put to death; you shall not light a [fire](fire.html) on the [Sabbath](sabbath.html) day”. The [law](law.html) against lighting a [fire](fire.html) on the [Sabbath](sabbath.html), though already implied in “any work”, is mentioned separately in order to indicate that the penalty for lighting a [fire](fire.html) on the [Sabbath](sabbath.html) is not as drastic.

The [law](law.html) of the boil[[31]](#footnote-31) and the burn[[32]](#footnote-32) are treated specifically even though these are specific instances of the general rule regarding [plague](plagues.html) spots.[[33]](#footnote-33) Therefore the general restrictions regarding the [Law](law.html) of the secod week[[34]](#footnote-34) and the quick raw flesh[[35]](#footnote-35) are not applied to them.[[36]](#footnote-36)

**10.** *Anything that was part of a general principle and was later singled out to discuss another point not similar to [the general principle] was singled out in order to be more lenient as well as to be more stingent*.

The particular implied in the general and excepted from it on account of some other special regulation which does not correspond in concept to the general, is thus isolated either to decrease or to increase the rigidity of its application.

The Torah[[37]](#footnote-37) states a general rule that *a* [*Jewish*](gen-jew.html) *servant* gains his [freedom](freedom.html) after [six](six.html) years of servitude. Later (v.7) the Torah singles out *a* [*Jewish*](gen-jew.html)[*female*](male%2Bfemale.html) *servant* and rules that she does not go free as does a [Jewish](gen-jew.html) servant. On the [one](one.html) [hand](fourteen.html), this gives the [Jewish](gen-jew.html) [female](male%2Bfemale.html) servant a lenient rule, that unlike a [male](male%2Bfemale.html) servant, she gains her [freedom](freedom.html) upon reaching adulthood (around the age of 12) or upon the death of the master. On the other [hand](fourteen.html), it gives her also a stringent rule, for her master may marry her if he so [desires](needs.html).[[38]](#footnote-38)

According to Shemot 21:29-30, the proprietor of a vicious animal which has killed a man or a woman must pay such compensation as may be imposed on him by the court. In a succeeeding verse, the Torah adds: “If an ox goes a slave, [male](male%2Bfemale.html) or [female](male%2Bfemale.html), he must pay the master [thirty](thirty.html) shekels of silver”. The case of a slave, though already included in pre preceding general [law](law.html) of the slain man or woman, contains a different provision, the *fixed* amount of compensation, with the result that whether the slave was valued at more than [thirty](thirty.html) shekels or less than [thirty](thirty.html) shekels, the proprietor of the animal must invariably pay [thirty](thirty.html) shekels.

The details on [laws](law.html) of [plagues](plagues.html) in the [hair](hair.html) or [beard](hair.html)[[39]](#footnote-39) are dissimilar from those in the general rule of [plague](plagues.html) spots. Therefore both the relaxation regarding the white [hair](hair.html) mentioned in the general rule[[40]](#footnote-40) and the restriction of the yellow [hair](hair.html) mentioned in the particular instance[[41]](#footnote-41) are applied[[42]](#footnote-42).

**11.** *Anything that was part of a general principle and was singled out to be considered in a* [*new*](new.html) *matter, you cannot return it to its general principle unless Scripture returns it explicitly to its general principle*.

The particular implied in the general and excepted from it on account of a [new](new.html) and reversed decision can be referred to the general only in case the passage under consideration makes an explicit reference to it.

The Torah[[43]](#footnote-43) permits anyone owned by, or born to a [*kohen*](priests.html) ([Priest](priests.html)), and his immediate family to [eat](eating.html) *terumah* (fruits or grains designated for a [kohen](priests.html)). Hence a [*kohen*](priests.html)*’s* daughter may [eat](eating.html) *terumah*. However, should she marry a non-[*kohen*](priests.html), she would be prohibited from [eating](eating.html) *terumah*. (The Torah removed her from the general principle.) Should her husband then die or divorce her, she would be permitted to resume [eating](eating.html) terumah (if she has no children from him) only because the Torah returned her to the category *the daughter of a* [*kohen*](priests.html), and explicitly permitted her to do so.

The guilt-[offering](korbanot) which a cured leper had to bring was unlike all other guilt-offerings in this, that some of its [blood](body.html) was sprinkled on the person who offered it.[[44]](#footnote-44) On account of this peculiarity none of the rules connected with other offerings would apply to that brought by a cured leper, had not the Torah expressly added: “As the [sin](sin.html)-[offering](korbanot) so is the guilt-[offering](korbanot)”.

The guilt [offering](korbanot) of the leper requires the placing of the [blood](body.html) on the ear, thumb, and toe.[[45]](#footnote-45) Consequently, the [laws](law.html) of the general guilt [offering](korbanot), such as the sprinkling of the [blood](body.html) on the alter[[46]](#footnote-46) would not have applied, were it not for the Torah passage: "For as the [sin](sin.html) [offering](korbanot) is the [priest](priests.html)'s so is the guilt offereing",[[47]](#footnote-47) i.e. that this is like other guilt offerings.[[48]](#footnote-48)

**12.** *A matter derived from its context, or a matter derived from its end* (i.e. from what follows it).

Deduction from the context.

The Torah included *You shall not steal* as [one](one.html) of the [ten](ten.html) [commandments](cmds613.html). It is not clear, however, whether this verse is a prohibition against stealing property or against stealing a human being, i.e. kidnapping. The Sages derived from the context that it is a prohibition against kidnapping, which is a capital offense, since the preceding, and following, injunctions, *You shall not murder* and *you shall not commit adultery* are capital offenses.

The Torah [first](one.html) writes[[49]](#footnote-49) *no person shal have relations with any relative*. This verse implies that it is forbidden to marry *any* relative, regardless of how distant. The Torah then proceeds to list which relatives are forbidden in [marriage](mashal.html), indicating that [one](one.html) may marry any relatives that are not included in that list, namely, the more distant relatives.

The noun *tinshemeth* occurs in Vayikra (Leviticus) 11:18 among the unclean birds, and again (verse 30) among the reptiles. Hence, it becomes certain that *tinshemeth* is the [name](name.html) of a certain bird as well as of a certain reptile.

In Devarim 19:6, with regard to the [cities of refuge](elul.html) where the manslayer is to flee, we read: “So that the avenger of [blood](body.html) may not pursue the manslayer … and slay him, *and he is not deserving of death*”. That the last clause refers to the slayer, and not to the [blood](body.html) avenger, is made clear by the subsequent clause: “inasmuch as he hated him not in [time](time.html) past”.

"I put the [plague](plagues.html) of leporasy in a house of the land of your possesion",[[50]](#footnote-50) refers only to a house built with stones, timber, and mortar, since these materials are mentioned later in verse 45.

**13.** *The resolution of* [*two*](two.html) *verses that [seem] to contradict* [*one*](one.html) *another is that a* [*third*](three.html) *verse will come and reconcile them*.

When [two](two.html) Biblical passages contradict each other the contradiction in question must be solved by reference to a [third](three.html) passage.

The Torah writes[[51]](#footnote-51) *In the beginning God created the* [*heavens*](heaven.html) *and the earth* (see Rashi for the explanation of this verse). This verse implies that the [heavens](heaven.html) were created before the earth. But later it writes[[52]](#footnote-52) *on the day that God made earth and* [*heavens*](heaven.html), which implies that the earth was created [first](one.html). However, a [third](three.html) verse resolves the apparent contradiction by stating[[53]](#footnote-53) ([HaShem](hashem.html) says:) *Also my* [*Hand*](fourteen.html) *founded the earth while my right* [*hand*](mashal.html) *formed the* [*heavens*](heaven.html), indicating that the [heavens](heaven.html) and earth were created simultaneously.

In Shemot 13:6 we read: “[Seven](seven.html) days you shall [eat](eating.html) [unleavened](chametz.html) bread”, and in Devarim 16:8 we are told: “[Six](six.html) days you shall [eat](eating.html) [unleavened](chametz.html) bread”. The contradiction between these [two](two.html) passages is explained by a reference to a [third](three.html) passage[[54]](#footnote-54) where the use of the [new](new.html) produce is forbidden until the second day of [Passover](passover.html). Hence, the passage in Shemot 13:6 must refer to [unleavened](chametz.html) bread prepared of the produce of a previous year.

After being commanded to remove [Isaac](isaac.html) from the altar, [Avraham](avraham.html) asked [HaShem](hashem.html) to explain [two](two.html) contradictory verses. [First](one.html) [HaShem](hashem.html) said that [Isaac](isaac.html) would be the forefather of [Israel](gen-jew.html)[[55]](#footnote-55) and then He commanded that [Avraham](avraham.html) to slaughter him[[56]](#footnote-56) [HaShem](hashem.html) explained that the wording of the [command](cmds613.html) was to *place* [*Isaac*](isaac.html) *on the altar*, but not to slaughter him on it.[[57]](#footnote-57) Thus, there is no contradiction.

**Rashi’s Commentary for: Bamidbar (**[**Numbers**](nchart.html)**) 7:89 When Moses would enter** [When there are] [two](two.html) contradictory verses, the [third](three.html) [one](one.html) comes and reconciles them. [One](one.html) verse says, “the Lord [spoke](mashal.html) to him from the Tent of Meeting”,[[58]](#footnote-58) and that implies outside the curtain, whereas another verse says, “and [speak](mashal.html) to you from above the [ark](ark.html) cover”[[59]](#footnote-59) [which is beyond the curtain]. This [verse] comes and reconciles them: Moses came into the Tent of Meeting, and there he would hear the voice [of God] [coming](coming.html) from [between the [cherubim](angels.html),] above the [ark](ark.html) cover.[[60]](#footnote-60)

Rules [seven](seven.html) to [eleven](eleven.html) are formed by a subdivision of the [fifth](five.html) rule of Hillel; rule [twelve](twelve.html) corresponds to the [seventh](seven.html) rule of Hillel, but is amplified in certain particulars; rule [thirteen](thirteen.html) does not occur in Hillel, while, on the other [hand](fourteen.html), the [sixth](six.html) rule of Hillel is omitted by Ishmael.

\* \* \*

The Bnei Yisaschar[[61]](#footnote-61) explains that the [thirteen](thirteen.html) middot of Rabbi Yishmael used to explain the Torah correspond to the 13 *middot harachamim* which we invoke when we recite selichot. Yet, these [thirteen](thirteen.html) are not a single unit, but actually are divided into a group of [twelve](twelve.html) middot of chessed and [one](one.html) middah of din. The single middahof din, which is described by the [name](name.html) “*K-l*”, corresponds to the middah of *kal v’chomer*. The [Talmud](orallaw.html), in fact, uses the simple term “din” as a reference to *kal v’chomer*, e.g. the [mishna](orallaw.html) in Bava Kamma uses the expression “*dayo l’ba min HaDin*”. Halachically, there is a fundamental difference that exists between *kal v’chomer* and all the other middot used to explain the Torah. Only *kal v’chomer* can be derived purely on the basis of *sevara*, logical inference, while all the other middot require a tradition handed down from [one](one.html)’s [teacher](teacher.html). The greatest chessed in the [world](worlds.html) is [HaShem](hashem.html) giving of himself to us. The middot of rachamim cause [HaShem](hashem.html) to reveal more of his presence in the [world](worlds.html), and correspondingly, the middot we use to explain the Torah reveal how much more of [HaShem](hashem.html)’s presence is with us that we see through a superficial reading of the Torah. Yet, even at a [time](time.html) of din when [HaShem](hashem.html)’s presence is hidden, we must trust that he is with us and seek him out; even when there is no mesorah and tradition to explain a text of Torah, we are free to use kal v’chomer to seek and find that meaning ourselves. *‘Piha pascha b’chachma’*, explains the Bnei Yisaschar, refers to the middahof *kal v’chomer* which requires human intellect to reveal; ‘*v’Torat chessed al leshona’* refers to the [laws](law.html) explicitly stated in the Torah which fall under the rubric of *chessed*.

\* \* \*

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1. The [Hermeneutical Laws](rules.html) for the first and second levels of Rabbinical Hermeneutics you will find in the Siddur. In the ArtScroll Siddur (Nusach Sefard), pp. 53-54, which are found in the Morning Service on the "Offerings Section" before the "Kadish D'Rabanan" (The Rabbi's Kaddish) and which are a quote from the Sifra. The laws of Hermeneutics for this second level are recited every single day of the year by all Torah Observant [Jews](gen-jew.html)! [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Found in The Jewish Encyclopedia under “Rules”. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Found in The Jewish Encyclopedia under “Rules”. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Sifrei 32:45 [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Mizrachi; Sifsei Chachamim [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Gur Aryeh [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Bamidbar (Numbers) 28:2 [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Bamidbar (Numbers) 9:2 [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Pesachim 66a; b [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Devarim (Deuteronomy) 24:2 [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Kiddushin 5a [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Shemot 21:2 [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Devarim (Deuteronomy) 15:12 [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Yevamot 54b [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Vayikra 1:2 [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Devarim 22:3 [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Shemot 13:2 [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Shemot 35:3 [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Vayikra (Leviticus) 7:19 [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Vayikra (Leviticus) 20:27 [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Devarim 18:10f [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Sanhedrin 67b [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. See Rashi on Shemot (Exodus) 10:22. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Devarim (Deuteronomy) 16:8. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Shemot (Exodus) 12:18. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. From the Mechilta. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Iyov (Job) 15:7. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Shemot (Exodus) 34:25. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. From Mechilta, Pesachim 5a. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Shemot (Exodus) 21:12 [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Vayikra (Leviticus) 13:18-21 [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. Vayikra (Leviticus) 13:24-28 [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Vayikra (Leviticus) 13:1-17 [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Vayikra (Leviticus) 13:5 [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Vayikra (Leviticus) 13:10 [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. Sifra 1:2 [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. Shemot 21:2 [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. see Shemot 21:8 [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. Vayikra (Leviticus) 13:29-37 [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. Vayikra (Leviticus) 13:4 [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. Vayikra (Leviticus) 13:30 [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. Sifra 1:3 [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. Vayikra (Leviticus) 22:11 [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. Vayikra (Leviticus) 14:13-14 [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. Vayikra (Leviticus) 14:14 [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. Vayikra (Leviticus) 7:2 [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. Vayikra (Leviticus) 14:13 [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. Yevamot 7a-b [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. Vayikra (Leviticus) 18:6 [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. Vayikra (Leviticus) 14:34 [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. Bereshit 1:1 [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. ibid. 2:4 [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. Isaiah 48:13 [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. Vayikra (Leviticus) 23:14 [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. Bereshit 21:12 [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. Bereshit 22:2 [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. Midrash to Bereshit 22:12 [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. Vayikra (Leviticus) 1:1 [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. Shemot (Exodus) 25:22 [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. Sifrei Naso 1:162 [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. Chodesh Tishrei Ma’amar #7 as well as other places [↑](#footnote-ref-61)