By Hillel ben David (Greg
Killian)
The Torah is understood and interpreted according to the level being
discussed. The Torah can be understood on four levels, while other writings
may be confined to only one level. For example, Bereshit (the book of Genesis)
can be understood on all four levels, while the Midrash
and sefer Matitiyahu (Matthew) can only be understood on the drash level. The following chart details
these four levels.
|
פרדס |
פשאת |
רמס |
דרש |
סוד |
|
PaRDeS |
Pshat |
Remez |
Derash |
Sod |
|
Definition |
Simple |
Hint |
Explore - Ask |
Secret |
|
Literary level |
Grammatical |
Allegory |
Parabolic |
Mystical |
|
Audience level |
Common People |
Noble (Lawyers, Judges, Scientists) |
Kingly (civil servants, political scientists) |
Mystic (psychologists) |
|
Hermeneutic level[1] |
7 Hillel Laws |
13 Ishmael Laws |
32 Ben Gallil Laws |
42 Zohar Laws |
|
Rabbinic level |
||||
|
Gospel |
Marqos (Mark), 1 & 2 Peter |
I and II Luqas (Luke) |
Matityahu (Matthew) |
Yochanan (John) 1, 2, 3, and Revelation |
|
Presentation |
HaShem’s Servant |
Son of Man |
The King |
Son of G-D |
|
Principle Concern |
What do we have to do? |
What is the meaning behind what we have to do? |
How do we go about establishing HaShem's Kingdom on earth? |
What metaphysical meaning is there to what is happening? |
|
World |
Asiyah |
Yetzirah |
Beriyah |
Atzilut |
|
Symbol |
Man |
Ox/Bull |
Lion |
Eagle |
|
Mazzaroth |
Deli |
Shaur |
Aryeh |
Aqurav |
|
Tribe |
Reuben |
Ephraim |
Judah |
Dan |
|
Temple |
Outside Chatzer |
Chatzer |
Kodesh |
Kodesh Kodashim |
|
Purim |
Mikrah Megillah |
Matanot L’Evyonim |
Mishloach Manot |
Seudas Purim |
For a geater explanation for these four levels, look at the study titled: REMEZ. Each
of these four levels has its own rules for proper
interpretation. The rest of this paper deals with the details of these rules.
The Thirty-two Rules
of
Eliezer B. Jose Ha-Ge-lili[2]
Rules laid down by
R. Eliezer b. Jose Ha-Gelili for haggadic exgesis, many of them being applied
also to halakic interpretation.
1. Ribbuy (extension): The particles “et”, “gam”, and
“af”, which are superfluous indicate that something which is not explicitly
stated must be regarded as included in the passage uinder consideration, or
that some teaching is implied thereby.
2. Mi’ut (limitation): The particles “ak”, “rak”, and
“min”, indicate that something implied by the concept under consideration must
be excluded in a specific case.
3. Ribbuy ahar
ribbuy (extension after
extension): When one extension follows another it indicates that more must be
regarded as implied.
4. Mi’ut ahar
mi’ut (limitation after
limitation): A double limitation indicates that more is to be omitted.
5. Kal va-chomer
meforash: “Argumentum a minori ad
majus”, or vice versa, and expressly so characterized in the text.
6. Kal va-chomer satum: “Argumentum a minori ad majus” or vice versa,
but only implied, not explicitly declared to be one in the text. This and the
preceeding rule are contained in the Rules of Hillel number 1.
7. Gezerah shawah: Argument from analagy.
Biblical passages containing synonyms or homonyms are subject, however much
they differ in other respects, to identical definitions and applications.
8. Binyan ab mi-katub ehad:
Application of a provision found in one passage only to passages which
are related to the first in content but do not contain the provision in
question.
9. Derek Kezarah: Abbreviation is sometimes used in the text
when the subject of discussion is self-explanatory.
10. Dabar shehu
shanuy (repeated
expression): Repitition implies a special meaning.
11. Siddur
she-nehlak: Where in the
text a clause or sentence not logically divisible is divided by the
punctuation, the proper order and the division of the verses must be restored
according to the logical connection.
12. Anything introduced as a comparison to illustrate
and explain something else itself receives in this way a better explanation and
elucidation.
13. When the general is followed by the particular,
the latter is specific to the former and merely defines it more exactly.
(compare with Hillel #5)
14. Something important is compared with something
unimportant to elucidate it and render it more readily intelligible.
15. When two Biblical passages contradict each other the
contradiction in question must be solved by reference to a third passage.
16. Dabar meyuhad bi-mekomo: An expression which
occurs in only one passage can be explained only by the context. This must have
been the original meaning of the rule, although another explanation is given in
the examples cited in the baraita.
17. A point which is not clearly explained in the
main passage may be better elucidated in another passage.
18. A statement with regard to a part may imply the
whole.
19. A statement concerning one thing may hold good
with regard to another as well.
20. A stetment concerning one thing may apply only to
something else.
21. If one object is compared to two other objects
the best part of both the latter forms the tertium quid of comparison.
22. A passage may be supplemented and explained by a
parallel passage.
23. A passage serves to elucidate and supplement its
parallel passage.
24. When the specific implied in the general is
especially excepted from the general, it serves to emphasize some property
characterizing the specific.
25. The specific implied in the general is frequently
excepted from the general to elucidate some other specific property, and to
develop some special teaching concerning it.
26. Mashal
(parable).
27. Mi-ma’al: Interpretation through the preceding.
28. Mi-neged: Interpretation through the opposite.
29. Gematria: Interpretation according to the numerical value
of the letters.
30. Notarikon: Interpretation by dividing a word into two or
more parts.
31. Postposition of the precedent. Many phraes which
follow must be regarded as properly preceding, and must be interpreted
accordingly in exegesis.
32. May portions of the Bible refer to an earlier
period than to the sections which precede them, and vice versa.
These thirty-two rules
are united in the so-called Baraita of R. Eliezer b. Jose HaGelili. In the
introduction to the Midrash ha-Gadole, where this baraita is given, it contains
thirty-three rules. Rule 29 being divided into three,
and rule 27 being omitted.
1. Kal
Va-Chomer:
Argument that reasons: If a rule or fact applies
in a situation where there is relatively little reason for it to apply,
certainly it applies in a situation where there is more reason for it to apply.
For example, in the verse: Moses says, “If Israel,
for whom my message is beneficial, will not listen to me, certainly Pharaoh,
for whom the message is detrimental, will not listen” (Mizrachi; Sifsei
Chachamim).
Another reason that Pharaoh would not listen
is because Moses was “of blocked lips”, and it is unbefitting that one with a speech
defect should speak before the king. However, to the general populace such an
impediment is not significant. So, if the Israelites who should not have
demurred because of Moses’ blocked lips, nevertheless ignored him, certainly
Pharaoh, who was unused to such speech, would reject
his message. Thus, the statement, “I am of blocked lips”, is part of the val
vachomer. And it is to emphasize this that Rashi commented on “blocked lips”
before “So how will Pharaoh listen to me?” (Gur Aryeh)
Midrash Rabbah -
Genesis XCII:7 AND WHEN THEY WERE GONE OUT OF THE CITY... IS NOT THIS IT IN WHICH MY
LORD DRINKETH... AND HE OVERTOOK THEM... AND THEY SAID UNTO HIM:... BEHOLD, THE
MONEY, etc. (XLIV, 4-8). R. Ishmael taught: This is one of the ten a fortiori arguments recorded in the Torah. (i)
BEHOLD, THE MONEY, WHICH WE FOUND IN OUR SACKS’ MOUTHS, WE BROUGHT BACK UNTO
THEE; does it then not stand to reason, How THEN SHOULD WE STEAL, etc. (ii)
Behold, the children of Israel have not hearkened unto me; surely all the more,
How then shall Pharaoh hear me (Ex. VI, 12). (iii) Behold, while I am yet alive
with you this day, ye have been rebellious against the Lord; does it not follow
then, And how much more after my death (Deut. XXXI, 27). (iv) And the Lord said
unto Moses: If her father had but spit in her face; surely it would stand to
reason, Should she not hide in shame seven days Num.
XII, 14). (v) If thou hast run with the footmen, and they have wearied thee, is
it not logical to say, Then how canst thou contend with horses (Jer. XII, 5). (vi) Behold, we are afraid
here in
There are ten val chomer arguments, enumerated
in Bereshit Rabbah 92:7, that appear in Torah, as cited by Rashi:
Genesis 44:8
Exodus 6:12
Numbers
Deuteronomy 31:27
I Samuel 23:3
Jeremiah 12:5 (2 arguments)
Ezekiel 15:5
Proverbs 11:31
Esther 9:12
2. Gezerah shawah:
Argument from analagy. Biblical passages
containing synonyms or homonyms are subject, however much they differ in other
respects, to identical definitions and applications.
3. Binyan ab mi-katub ehad:
Application of a provision found in one passage only to passages which
are related to the first in content but do not contain the provision in
question.
4. Binyan ab mi-shene ketubim: The
same as the preceeding except that the provision is generalized from two Biblical passages.
5. Kelal u-Perat and Perat u-kelal: Definition of the
general by the particular, and of the particular, and of the particular by the
general.
6. Ka-yoze bo
mi-makon aher: Similarity in context to another scriptural
passage.
7. Dabar ha-lamed me-‘inyano:
Interpretation deduced from the context.
* * *
The Thirteen rules
of Rabbi Ishmael
Thirteen rules compiled by Rabbi Ishmael b. Elisha for
the elucidation of the Torah and for making halachic
deductions from it. They are, strictly speaking, mere amplifications of the seven rules of Hillel, and are collected in the Baraita
of R. Ishmael, forming the introduction to the Sifra and reading as follows:
1. Kal
VaChomer: From a lenient law to a
strict law. (Identical with the first rule of Hillel.)
A kal vachomer is an a fortiori logical argument
that reasons: If a rule or fact applies in a situation where there is
relatively little reason for it to apply, certainly it applies in a situation
where there is more reason for it to apply. For example, in the verse: Moses
says, “If Israel, for whom my message is beneficial, will not listen to me,
certainly Pharaoh, for whom the message is detrimental, will not listen”
(Mizrachi; Sifsei Chachamim).
Another reason that Pharaoh would not listen
is because Moses was “of blocked lips”, and it is unbefitting that one with a
speech defect should speak before the king. However, to the general populace
such an impediment is not significant. So, if the Israelites who should not
have demurred because of Moses’ blocked lips, nevertheless ignored him,
certainly Pharaoh, who was unused to such speech, would reject his message.
Thus, the statement, “I am of blocked lips”, is part of the val vachomer. And
it is to emphasize this that Rashi commented on “blocked lips” before “So how
will Pharaoh listen to me?” (Gur Aryeh)
If, for example, a certain act is forbidden
on an ordinary festival, it is so much more
forbidden on Yom HaKippurim. If a certain act is
permissable on Yom HaKippurim, it is so much more permissable on an ordinary
festival.
If a tamid offering may be offered on Shabbat, even though if it is not brought there is no
punishment of keret (a divine punishment of premature death) involved,
then certainally the Pesach offering may be offered
on Shabbat, since if it is not brought there is a punishment of keret
involved.
If it is forbidden to pluck an apple from a
tree on festivals (when food may be prepared by cooking
and other means that may be prohibited on Shabbat), surely plucking is
forbidden on Shabbat. Conversely, if it is permitted to slice vegetables on
Shabbat, it is surely permitted on the festivals.
The reverse is also true, if a lenient
ruling applies to a stringent law, then certainally that lenient ruling applies
to a lenient law.
2. Gezerah shavah: From a similarity of words. (Identical with the second rule of
Hillel.)
Argument from analagy. Biblical passages
containing synonyms or homonyms are subject, however much they differ in other
respects, to identical definitions and applications.
If a similar word or expression occurs in two
places in scripture, the rulings of each place may be applied to the other.
“Similar words” cannot be original; it must be passed from master to disciple, originating with Moshe to whom HaShem taught at Mount Sinai.
In strictly limited cases, the Sinaitic tradition teaches that the two independent laws or cases are meant to shed light upon one another. The
indication that the two laws are complementary can be
seen in two ways: (a) The same or similar words appear in both cases, e.g. the
word in its proper time (Bamidbar 28:2), is understood to indicate that
the daily offering must be brought even on Shabbat. Similarly, the same word in
the context of the Pesach offering[4] should be interpreted
to mean that it is offered even if its appointed day, too, falls on Shabbat[5] When two different
topics are placed next to one another (this is also called comparison),
e.g. many laws regarding the technical process of
divorce and betrothal are derived from one another
because Scripture[6] mentions divorce and
betrothal in the same phrase by saying, she shall depart [through
divorce] and become betrothed to another man. This juxtaposition
iumplies that the two changes of marital status are accomplished through
similar legal processes.[7]
The phrase ‘Hebrew slave” (Shemot 21:2) is
ambiguous, for it may mean a heathen slave owned by a Hebrew, or else, a slave
who is a Hebrew. That the latter is the correct
meaning is proved by a reference to the phrase “your Hebrew brother”[8], where the same law is
mentioned (… If your Hebrew brother is sold to you …).
3. Binyan Ab: From
a general principle found in one verse, or from a general principle found in two verses. (This rule is a combination of the third
and fourth rules of Hillel.)
Rules deduced from a single passaage of Scripture and rules deduced
from two passages.
The Torah teaches that work in preparation of food
is permitted on Pesach. We extend this ruling to apply
to other holidays as well.
Where one verse may not be sufficient to apply its rule elsewhere, a
combination of two verses might be. For example: The Torah holds the owner of
an ox liable for the damages caused by the ox. This ruling applies even if the
damages it inflicts occurred somewhere other than where the owner originally
placed the ox. Similarly, one is liable for the damages caused by a pit he dug,
or by an inanimate obstacle he placed in a public domain. From the combination
of these two laws we derive a third law that if a person places an obstacle in the public domain and it
caused damage somewhere other than where it was originally placed, the person
who originally put it down is liable. See Bava Kama 6a.
From Devarim 24:6 (“No one shall take a handmill or an upper millstone
in pledge, for he would be taking a life in pledge”) the Rabbis concluded:
“Everything which is used for preparing food is forbidden to be taken in
pledge”.
From Shemot 21:26-27 (“If a man strikes the eye of his slave … and
destroys it, he must let him go free in compensation for his eye.
If he knocks out the tooth of his slave … he must let him go free…”) the
Hakhamim concluded that when any part
of the slave’s body is mutilated by the master, the slave shall go free.
Since the Torah specifies that one may not marry
even his maternal half sister, this general principle, dictates that the
prohhibition against marrying ones father’s sister applies equally to his
father’s maternal half sister (Yevamot 54b). the same rule applies when two
different verses shed light on one another: Similar situations may be derived
from the combination of the two verses.
4. Kelal uPerat: From
a generality followed by a specific.
The general and the particular.
In Vayikra 18:6 the law reads: “None of you
shall marry anyone related to him”. This
generalization is followed by a specification of forbidden marriages. Hence,
this prohibition applies only to those expressly mentioned.
The Torah writes (Vayikra 1:2), If
a person shall offer a sacrifice to HaShem of an
animal, etc. The generalization of an
animal would seem to include any and all animals. However, Scripture
follows that phrase with, from cattle or
sheep, thereby specifying that only cattle and sheep are fit to be brought
as offerings.
5. uPerat ukelal: From
a specific followed by a generality.
The particular and the general.
In Shemot 22:9 we read: “If a man gives to his neighbor an ass, an ox, or a sheep, to keep, or any animal, and it
dies...”. The general phrase “any animal”, which follows the specification,
includes is this law all kinds of animals.
Regarding the mitzva of returning
a lost article, the Torah writes[9] so
shall you do for his donkey and so shall you do for
his garment. One might conclude that the mitzva
applies only to these items. The Torah therefore follows that phrase with so shall you do regarding any lost article
of your brother, thereby including all lost aticles in the mitzva.
6. Kelal uPerat ukelal: When a
generality is followed by a specific and a generality, you may infer only that
which is similar to the specific.
The general, the particular, and the general.
In Shemot 22:8 we are told that an embezzler shall pay double to his
neighbor “for anything embezzled [generalization], for ox, or ass, or sheep, or
clothing [specification], or any article lost [generalization]. Since the
specification includes only moveable property, and objects of intrinsic value,
the fine of double payment does not apply to embezzled real estate, not to
notes and bills since the latter represents only a symbolic value.
Devarim 14:26 Other things than those specified in Devarim 14:26 may be
purchased, but only if they are food or drink like
those specified.
7. kelal shehu tzerik lefrat: From a generality that requires an
explanatory specific, and from a specific that requires an explanatory
generality.
The general which requires elucidation by the particular, and the
particular which requires elucidation by the general.
The Torah writes (Shemot 13:2) Sanctify
to me any firstborn, which implies that even a female firstborn would be
included in this law. The Torah therefore explicitly states that included in
this law are only males (v.12). (The
previous employs derivation method #4; what follows employs method #7, see
Rashi to tractate Bechorot 19a. However, one might still think that a firstborn
male, even if preceded by females, is to be sanctified. The Torah therefore
says (v.2) the first to leave the womb. However, one might still think
that if a male is the first to leave the womb, even if it was preceded by one
born by caesarean section, it is to be sanctified. The verse therefore states: Firstborn. Thus, it must be a male and the absolute firstborn if it is to
be sanctified. Hence, we have an illustration of a generality (firstborn) that requires a specific (the first to leave the womb) to define
it, and vice versa.
In Vayikra 17:13 we read: “He shall pour out its blood and cover it
with dust”. The verb “to cover” is a general term, since there are various ways
of covering a thing; “with dust” is specific. If we were to apply rule four to this passage, the law would
be that the blood of the slaughtered animal must be covered with nothing except
duct. Since, however, the general term “to cover” may also mean “to hide”, our
present passage necessarily requires the specific expression “with dust”;
otherwise the law might be interpreted to mean the blood is to be concealed in
a closed vessle. On the other hand, the specification “with dust” without the
general expression “to cover” would be meaningless.
8. Anything
that was part of a general principle and was later singled out from the general
principle to teach [a specific piece of information], it is not to teach [this
information] only about itself that it was singled out, but to teach [this
information] regarding the entire general principle was it singled out.
The particular implied in the general and excepted from it for
pedagogic purposes elucidates the general as well as the particular.
The Torah writes (Shemot 35:3) Do
not kindle a fire in all your habitation on the Shabbat day. Now kindling is included in the
general category of work prohibited on
Shabbat. Why then is it singled out with its own verse? It is singled out
in order to compare the other to kindling,
that just as when one kindles on Shabbat unintentionally he must bring a sin offering as
atonement for that one action, so, if one performes several labors prohibited
on Shabbat unintentionally, he is required to bring a separate sin offering for each and every one.
Hence, the specific law teaches something with regard to the general law.
In Devarim 22:1 we are told that the finder of lost property must
return it to its owner. In the next verse the Torah adds: “You shall do the
same … with his garment and with
anything lost by your brother… which you have found …”. Garment, though
included in the general expression “anything lost”, is specifically mentioned
in order to indicate that the duty to announce the finding of lost articles
applies only to such objects which are likely to have an owner, and which have,
as in the case of clothing, some marks by which they can be identified.
The Torah (Vayikra 7:19) forbids the eating
of sacrificial meat by anyone who is ritually
contaminated. The very next verse singles out the peace-offering, and
states that a contaminated person who eats of it is liable to keret, spiritual
excision. This principle teaches that the peace-offering is not an exception to
the the general rule; rather that the punishment specified for the
peace-offering applies to all offerings.
"A man, also, or a woman that devines that by a ghost or a
familiar spirit, shall surel be put to death; they shall stone them with
stones" (Vayikra 20:27) Divination by a ghost or a familiar spirit is
included in the general rule against witchcraft (Devarim 18:10f). Since the
penalty in Vayikra 20:27 is stoneing it may be inferred that the same penalty
applies to other instasnces within the same general rule.[10]
9. Anything
that was part of a general principle and was later singled out to discuss
another point similar to [the general principle] was singled out in order to be
more lenient, but not to be more stingent.
The particular implied in the general and excepted from it on account
of the special regulation which corresponds in concept to the general, is thus
isolated to decrease rather than to increase the rigidity of its application.
The Torah says (Shemot 21:12) One
who kills a person shall be put to death. This verse would seem to mandate
the death penalty both for one who kills intentionally and also for one who
kills unintentionally. The Torah then writes (v.13) that if one kills another
person unintentionally, he is not put
to death; rather, he is exiled to one of the cities of refuge (Devarim 19:5),
One who kills unintentionally is thereby singled out from the general principle
of one who kills a person shall be put to
death, to indicate that his punishment is more lenient, and he is not
subject to death, merely to exile.
In Shemot 35:2-3 we read: “Whoever does any work on the Sabbath shall be put to death; you shall not light a
fire on the Sabbath day”. The law against lighting a fire
on the Sabbath, though already implied in “any work”, is mentioned separately
in order to indicate that the penalty for lighting a fire on the Sabbath is not
as drastic.
The law of the boil (Vayikra 13:18-21) and the
burn (Vayikra 13:24-28) are treated specifically even though these are specific
instances of the general rule regarding plague spots (Vayikra 13:1-17)
Therefore the general restrictions regarding the Law of the secod week (Vayikra
13:5) and the quick raw flesh (Vayikra 13:10 are not applied to them (Sifra
1:2)
10. Anything
that was part of a general principle and was later singled out to discuss
another point not similar to [the general principle] was singled out in order
to be more lenient as well as to be more stingent.
The particular implied in the general and excepted from it on account
of some other special regulation which does not correspond in concept to the
general, is thus isolated either to decrease or to increase the rigidity of its
application.
The Torah (Shemot 21:2) states a general rule that a Jewish servant gains his freedom after six
years of servitude. Later (v.7) the Torah singles out a Jewish female servant and rules that she does not go free as does
a Jewish servant. On the one hand, this gives the
Jewish female servant a lenient rule, that unlike a male servant, she gains her
freedom upon reaching adulthood (around the age of
12) or upon the death of the master. On the other hand, it gives her also a
stringent rule, for her master may marry her if
he so desires (see Shemot 21:8).
According to Shemot 21:29-30, the proprietor of a vicious animal which
has killed a man or a woman must pay such compensation as may be imposed on him
by the court. In a succeeeding verse, the Torah adds: “If an ox goes a slave,
male or female, he must pay the master thirty shekels of silver”. The case of a
slave, though already included in pre preceding general law of the slain man or
woman, contains a different provision, the fixed
amount of compensation, with the result that whether the slave was valued at
more than thirty shekels or less than thirty shekels, the proprietor of the
animal must invariably pay thirty shekels.
The details on laws of plagues in the hair or beard (Vayikra 13:29-37)
are dissimilar from those in the general rule of plague spots. Therefore both
the relaxation regarding the white hair mentioned in the general rule (Vayikra
13:4) and the restriction of the yellow hair mentioned
in the particular instance (Vayikra 13:30) are applied[11].
11. Anything
that was part of a general principle and was singled out to be considered in a
new matter, you cannot return it to its general principle unless Scripture
returns it explicitly to its general principle.
The particular implied in the general and excepted from it on account
of a new and reversed decision can be referred to the general only in case the
passage under consideration makes an explicit reference to it.
The Torah (Vayikra 22:11) permits anyone owned by, or born to a kohen
(Priest), and his immediate family to eat terumah (fruits or grains designated for
a kohen). Hence a kohen’s daughter
may eat terumah. However, should she marry a non-kohen,
she would be prohibited from eating terumah.
(The Torah removed her from the general principle.) Should her husband then die
or divorce her, she would be permitted to resume eating
terumah (if she has no children from him) only because the Torah returned her
to the category the daughter of a kohen,
and explicitly permitted her to do so.
The guilt-offering which a cured leper had to bring was unlike all
other guilt-offerings in this, that some of its blood was sprinkled on the
person who offered it (Vayikra 14:13-14). On account of this peculiarity none
of the rules connected with other offerings would apply to that brought by a
cured leper, had not the Torah expressly added: “As the sin-offering so is the
guilt-offering”.
The guilt offering of the leper requires the placing of the blood on the ear, thumb, and toe (Vayikra 14:14). Consequently, the laws of the general guilt offering, such as the sprinkling of the blood on the alter (Vayikra 7:2) wou