By Hillel ben David (Greg Killian)
The Torah is understood and interpreted according to the level being discussed.
The Torah can be understood on four levels, while other writings may be confined to only one
level. For example, Bereshit (the book of Genesis) can be understood on all four
levels, while the Midrash and sefer Matitiyahu (Matthew)
can only be understood on the drash level.
The following chart details these four levels.
|
פרדס |
פשאת |
רמס |
דרש |
סוד |
|
PaRDeS |
Pshat |
Remez |
Derash |
Sod |
|
Definition |
Simple |
Hint |
Explore - Ask |
Secret |
|
Literary level |
Grammatical |
Allegory |
Parabolic |
Mystical |
|
Audience level |
Common People |
Noble (Lawyers, Judges, Scientists) |
Kingly (civil servants, political scientists) |
Mystic (psychologists) |
|
Hermeneutic level[1] |
7 Hillel Laws |
13 Ishmael Laws |
32 Ben Gallil Laws |
42 Zohar Laws |
|
Rabbinic level |
||||
|
Gospel |
Marqos (Mark), 1 & 2 Peter |
I and II Luqas (Luke) |
Matityahu (Matthew) |
Yochanan (John) 1, 2, 3, and Revelation |
|
Presentation |
HaShem’s Servant |
Son of Man |
The King |
Son of G-D |
|
Principle Concern |
What do we have to do? |
What is the meaning behind what we have to do? |
How do we go about establishing HaShem's Kingdom on earth? |
What metaphysical meaning is there to what is happening? |
|
World |
Asiyah |
Yetzirah |
Beriyah |
Atzilut |
|
Symbol |
Man |
Ox/Bull |
Lion |
Eagle |
|
Mazzaroth |
Deli |
Shaur |
Aryeh |
Aqurav |
|
Tribe |
Reuben |
Ephraim |
Judah |
Dan |
|
Temple |
Outside Chatzer |
Chatzer |
Kodesh |
Kodesh Kodashim |
|
Purim |
Mikrah Megillah |
Matanot L’Evyonim |
Mishloach Manot |
Seudas Purim |
For a geater explanation for these four levels, look at the study titled: REMEZ. Each of
these four levels has its own rules for proper interpretation.
The rest of this paper deals with the details of these rules.
The Thirty-two Rules
of
Eliezer B. Jose Ha-Ge-lili[2]
Rules laid down by R.
Eliezer b. Jose Ha-Gelili for haggadic exgesis, many of them being applied also
to halakic interpretation.
1. Ribbuy (extension): The particles “et”, “gam”, and “af”,
which are superfluous indicate that something which is not explicitly stated must
be regarded as included in the passage uinder consideration, or that some teaching
is implied thereby.
2. Mi’ut (limitation): The particles “ak”, “rak”, and
“min”, indicate that something implied by the concept under consideration must be
excluded in a specific case.
3. Ribbuy ahar ribbuy (extension after extension): When one extension
follows another it indicates that more must be regarded as implied.
4. Mi’ut ahar mi’ut (limitation after limitation): A double limitation
indicates that more is to be omitted.
5. Kal va-chomer meforash: “Argumentum a minori ad majus”, or vice versa, and
expressly so characterized in the text.
6. Kal va-chomer satum: “Argumentum a minori ad majus” or vice versa, but
only implied, not explicitly declared to be one in the text. This and the preceeding
rule are contained in the Rules of Hillel number 1.
7. Gezerah shawah: Argument from analagy.
Biblical passages containing synonyms or homonyms are subject, however much they
differ in other respects, to identical definitions and applications.
8. Binyan ab mi-katub
ehad: Application of a provision
found in one passage only to passages which are related to the first in content
but do not contain the provision in question.
9. Derek Kezarah: Abbreviation is sometimes used in the text when
the subject of discussion is self-explanatory.
10. Dabar shehu shanuy (repeated expression): Repitition implies a special
meaning.
11. Siddur she-nehlak: Where in the text a clause or sentence not logically
divisible is divided by the punctuation, the proper order and the division of the
verses must be restored according to the logical connection.
12. Anything introduced as a comparison to illustrate
and explain something else itself receives in this way a better explanation and
elucidation.
13. When the general is followed by the particular, the
latter is specific to the former and merely defines it more exactly. (compare with
Hillel #5)
14. Something important is compared with something unimportant
to elucidate it and render it more readily intelligible.
15. When two Biblical passages
contradict each other the contradiction in question must be solved by reference
to a third passage.
16. Dabar meyuhad bi-mekomo: An expression which occurs
in only one passage can be explained only by the context. This must have been the
original meaning of the rule, although another explanation is given in the examples
cited in the baraita.
17. A point which is not clearly explained in the main
passage may be better elucidated in another passage.
18. A statement with regard to a part may imply the whole.
19. A statement concerning one thing may hold good with
regard to another as well.
20. A stetment concerning one thing may apply only to
something else.
21. If one object is compared to two other objects the
best part of both the latter forms the tertium quid of comparison.
22. A passage may be supplemented and explained by a parallel
passage.
23. A passage serves to elucidate and supplement its parallel
passage.
24. When the specific implied in the general is especially
excepted from the general, it serves to emphasize some property characterizing the
specific.
25. The specific implied in the general is frequently
excepted from the general to elucidate some other specific property, and to develop
some special teaching concerning it.
26. Mashal (parable).
27. Mi-ma’al: Interpretation through the preceding.
28. Mi-neged: Interpretation through the opposite.
29. Gematria: Interpretation according to the numerical value of
the letters.
30. Notarikon: Interpretation by dividing a word into two or more
parts.
31. Postposition of the precedent. Many phraes which follow
must be regarded as properly preceding, and must be interpreted accordingly in exegesis.
32. May portions of the Bible refer to an earlier period
than to the sections which precede them, and vice versa.
These thirty-two rules are
united in the so-called Baraita of R. Eliezer b. Jose HaGelili. In the introduction
to the Midrash ha-Gadole, where this baraita is given, it contains thirty-three
rules. Rule 29 being divided into three, and rule 27 being
omitted.
1. Kal Va-Chomer:
Argument that reasons: If a rule or fact applies
in a situation where there is relatively little reason for it to apply, certainly
it applies in a situation where there is more reason for it to apply. For example,
in the verse: Moses says, “If Israel, for whom my message
is beneficial, will not listen to me, certainly Pharaoh, for whom the message is
detrimental, will not listen” (Mizrachi; Sifsei Chachamim).
Another reason that Pharaoh would not listen
is because Moses was “of blocked lips”, and it is unbefitting that one with a speech
defect should speak before the king. However, to the general populace such an impediment
is not significant. So, if the Israelites who should not have demurred because of
Moses’ blocked lips, nevertheless ignored him, certainly Pharaoh, who was unused
to such speech, would reject his message. Thus, the statement,
“I am of blocked lips”, is part of the val vachomer. And it is to emphasize this
that Rashi commented on “blocked lips” before “So how will Pharaoh listen to me?”
(Gur Aryeh)
Midrash Rabbah - Genesis
XCII:7 AND WHEN THEY WERE GONE OUT OF THE CITY... IS NOT THIS IT IN WHICH MY LORD
DRINKETH... AND HE OVERTOOK THEM... AND THEY SAID UNTO HIM:... BEHOLD, THE MONEY,
etc. (XLIV, 4-8). R. Ishmael taught: This is one of the ten
a fortiori arguments recorded in the Torah. (i) BEHOLD, THE MONEY, WHICH
WE FOUND IN OUR SACKS’ MOUTHS, WE BROUGHT BACK UNTO THEE; does it then not stand
to reason, How THEN SHOULD WE STEAL, etc. (ii) Behold, the children of Israel have
not hearkened unto me; surely all the more, How then shall Pharaoh hear me (Ex.
VI, 12). (iii) Behold, while I am yet alive with you this day, ye have been rebellious
against the Lord; does it not follow then, And how much more after my death (Deut.
XXXI, 27). (iv) And the Lord said unto Moses: If her father had but spit in her
face; surely it would stand to reason, Should she not hide in shame seven days Num. XII, 14). (v) If thou hast run with the footmen,
and they have wearied thee, is it not logical to say, Then how canst thou contend
with horses (Jer. XII, 5). (vi) Behold, we are afraid here in Judah; surely it stands
to reason, How much more then if we go to Keilah (I Sam. XXIII, 3). (vii) And if
in a land of Peace where thou art secure [thou art overcome], is it not logical
to ask, How wilt thou do in the thickets of the Jordan? Jer. loc. cit.). (viii)
Behold, the righteous shall be requited in the earth; does it not follow, How much
more the wicked and the sinner (Prov. XI, 31). (ix) And
the king said unto Esther the queen: The Jews have slain and destroyed five hundred men in Shushan
the castle; it stands to reason, What then have they done in the rest of the king's
provinces (Est. IX, 12). (x) Behold, when it was whole, it was meet for no work;
surely it is logical to argue, How much less, when the fire
hath devoured it, and it is singed, etc. (Ezek. XV, 5).)
There are ten val chomer arguments, enumerated in
Bereshit Rabbah 92:7, that appear in Torah, as cited by Rashi:
Genesis 44:8
Exodus 6:12
Numbers 12:14
Deuteronomy 31:27
I Samuel 23:3
Jeremiah 12:5 (2 arguments)
Ezekiel 15:5
Proverbs 11:31
Esther 9:12
2. Gezerah shawah:
Argument from analagy. Biblical passages containing synonyms or homonyms
are subject, however much they differ in other respects, to identical definitions
and applications.
3. Binyan ab mi-katub
ehad: Application of a provision
found in one passage only to passages which are related to the first in content
but do not contain the provision in question.
4. Binyan ab mi-shene
ketubim: The same as the preceeding
except that the provision is generalized from two Biblical
passages.
5. Kelal u-Perat and Perat u-kelal: Definition of the general
by the particular, and of the particular, and of the particular by the general.
6. Ka-yoze bo mi-makon
aher: Similarity in context to
another scriptural passage.
7. Dabar ha-lamed me-‘inyano: Interpretation deduced from the context.
* * *
The Thirteen rules of
Rabbi Ishmael
Thirteen rules compiled by Rabbi Ishmael b. Elisha for
the elucidation of the Torah and for making halachic
deductions from it. They are, strictly speaking, mere amplifications of the seven rules of Hillel, and are collected in the Baraita of
R. Ishmael, forming the introduction to the Sifra and reading as follows:
1. Kal VaChomer: From a lenient law to a strict law. (Identical with the first rule of
Hillel.)
A kal vachomer is an a fortiori logical argument
that reasons: If a rule or fact applies in a situation where there is relatively
little reason for it to apply, certainly it applies in a situation where there is
more reason for it to apply. For example, in the verse: Moses says, “If Israel, for whom my message is beneficial, will not listen
to me, certainly Pharaoh, for whom the message is detrimental, will not listen”.[4]
Another reason that Pharaoh would not listen
is because Moses was “of blocked lips”, and it is unbefitting that one with a speech
defect should speak before the king. However, to the general populace such an impediment
is not significant. So, if the Israelites who should not have demurred because of
Moses’ blocked lips, nevertheless ignored him, certainly Pharaoh, who was unused
to such speech, would reject his message. Thus, the statement, “I am of blocked
lips”, is part of the val vachomer. And it is to emphasize this that Rashi commented
on “blocked lips” before “So how will Pharaoh listen to me?” [5]
If, for example, a certain act is forbidden on
an ordinary festival, it is so much more forbidden on
Yom HaKippurim. If a certain act is permissable on Yom
HaKippurim, it is so much more permissable on an ordinary festival.
If a tamid offering may be offered on Shabbat, even though if it is not brought there is no punishment
of keret (a divine punishment of premature death) involved, then certainally
the Pesach offering may be offered on Shabbat, since
if it is not brought there is a punishment of keret involved.
If it is forbidden to pluck an apple from a tree
on festivals (when food may be prepared by cooking and other
means that may be prohibited on Shabbat), surely plucking is forbidden on Shabbat.
Conversely, if it is permitted to slice vegetables on Shabbat, it is surely permitted
on the festivals.
The reverse is also true, if a lenient ruling
applies to a stringent law, then certainally that lenient ruling applies to a lenient
law.
2. Gezerah shavah: From a similarity of words. (Identical with the second rule of Hillel.)
Argument from analagy. Biblical passages containing
synonyms or homonyms are subject, however much they differ in other respects, to
identical definitions and applications.
If a similar word or expression occurs in two places
in scripture, the rulings of each place may be applied to the other. “Similar words”
cannot be original; it must be passed from master to
disciple, originating with Moshe to whom HaShem taught
at Mount Sinai.
In strictly limited cases, the Sinaitic tradition teaches that the two independent laws or cases are meant to shed light upon one another. The
indication that the two laws are complementary can be seen
in two ways: (a) The same or similar words appear in both cases, e.g. the word in
its proper time,[6] is understood to indicate
that the daily offering must be brought even on Shabbat. Similarly, the same word
in the context of the Pesach offering[7] should be interpreted to
mean that it is offered even if its appointed day, too, falls on Shabbat[8] When two different topics
are placed next to one another (this is also called comparison), e.g. many
laws regarding the technical process of divorce and betrothal are derived from one another because Scripture[9] mentions divorce and betrothal
in the same phrase by saying, she shall depart [through divorce] and become
betrothed to another man. This juxtaposition iumplies that the two changes of
marital status are accomplished through similar legal processes.[10]
The phrase ‘Hebrew slave”[11] is ambiguous, for it may
mean a heathen slave owned by a Hebrew, or else, a slave who is a Hebrew. That the latter is the correct meaning is proved
by a reference to the phrase “your Hebrew brother”[12], where the same law is
mentioned (… If your Hebrew brother is sold to you …).
3. Binyan Ab: From a
general principle found in one verse, or from a general principle found in two verses. (This rule is a combination of the third and
fourth rules of Hillel.)
Rules deduced from a single passaage of Scripture and rules deduced from
two passages.
The Torah teaches that work in preparation of food
is permitted on Pesach. We extend this ruling to apply
to other holidays as well.
Where one verse may not be sufficient to apply its rule elsewhere, a combination
of two verses might be. For example: The Torah holds the owner of an ox liable for
the damages caused by the ox. This ruling applies even if the damages it inflicts
occurred somewhere other than where the owner originally placed the ox. Similarly,
one is liable for the damages caused by a pit he dug, or by an inanimate obstacle
he placed in a public domain. From the combination of these two laws we derive a
third law that if a person places an obstacle
in the public domain and it caused damage somewhere other than where it was originally
placed, the person who originally put it down is liable. See Bava Kama 6a.
From Devarim 24:6 (“No one shall take a handmill or an upper millstone in
pledge, for he would be taking a life in pledge”) the Rabbis concluded: “Everything
which is used for preparing food is forbidden to be taken in pledge”.
From Shemot 21:26-27 (“If a man strikes the eye of his slave … and destroys
it, he must let him go free in compensation for his eye.
If he knocks out the tooth of his slave … he must let him go free…”) the Hakhamim
concluded that when any part of the slave’s
body is mutilated by the master, the slave shall go free.
Since the Torah specifies that one may not marry
even his maternal half sister, this general principle, dictates that the prohhibition
against marrying ones father’s sister applies equally to his father’s maternal half
sister.[13] the same
rule applies when two different verses shed light on one another: Similar situations
may be derived from the combination of the two verses.
4. Kelal uPerat: From a
generality followed by a specific.
The general and the particular.
In Vayikra 18:6 the law reads: “None of you shall
marry anyone related to him”. This generalization
is followed by a specification of forbidden marriages. Hence, this prohibition applies
only to those expressly mentioned.
The Torah writes,[14] If a person
shall offer a sacrifice to HaShem of an animal, etc.
The generalization of an animal would
seem to include any and all animals. However, Scripture follows that phrase with,
from cattle or sheep, thereby specifying
that only cattle and sheep are fit to be brought as offerings.
5. uPerat ukelal: From a
specific followed by a generality.
The particular and the general.
In Shemot 22:9 we read: “If a man gives to his neighbor an ass, an ox, or a sheep, to keep, or any animal, and it dies...”.
The general phrase “any animal”, which follows the specification, includes is this
law all kinds of animals.
Regarding the mitzva of returning
a lost article, the Torah writes[15] so shall
you do for his donkey and so shall you do for his garment.
One might conclude that the mitzva applies only to these
items. The Torah therefore follows that phrase with so shall you do regarding any lost article of your brother, thereby
including all lost aticles in the mitzva.
6. Kelal uPerat ukelal: When a generality
is followed by a specific and a generality, you may infer only that which is similar
to the specific.
The general, the particular, and the general.
In Shemot 22:8 we are told that an embezzler shall pay double to his neighbor
“for anything embezzled [generalization], for ox, or ass, or sheep, or clothing
[specification], or any article lost [generalization]. Since the specification includes
only moveable property, and objects of intrinsic value, the fine of double payment
does not apply to embezzled real estate, not to notes and bills since the latter
represents only a symbolic value.
Devarim 14:26 Other things than those specified in Devarim 14:26 may be purchased,
but only if they are food or drink like those specified.
7. kelal shehu tzerik lefrat: From a generality that requires an explanatory
specific, and from a specific that requires an explanatory generality.
The general which requires elucidation by the particular, and the particular
which requires elucidation by the general.
The Torah writes[16] Sanctify
to me any firstborn, which implies that even a female firstborn would be included
in this law. The Torah therefore explicitly states that included in this law are
only males (v.12). The previous employs
derivation method #4; what follows employs method #7, see Rashi to tractate Bechorot
19a. However, one might still think that a firstborn male, even if preceded by females,
is to be sanctified. The Torah therefore says (v.2) the first to leave the womb. However, one
might still think that if a male is the first to leave the womb, even if it was
preceded by one born by caesarean section, it is to be sanctified. The verse therefore
states: Firstborn. Thus, it must be a
male and the absolute firstborn if it
is to be sanctified. Hence, we have an illustration of a generality (firstborn) that requires a specific (the first to leave the womb) to define it,
and vice versa.
In Vayikra 17:13 we read: “He shall pour out its blood and cover it with
dust”. The verb “to cover” is a general term, since there are various ways of covering
a thing; “with dust” is specific. If we were to apply rule four
to this passage, the law would be that the blood of the slaughtered
animal must be covered with nothing except duct. Since, however, the general term
“to cover” may also mean “to hide”, our present passage necessarily requires the
specific expression “with dust”; otherwise the law might be interpreted to mean
the blood is to be concealed in a closed vessle. On the other hand, the specification
“with dust” without the general expression “to cover” would be meaningless.
8. Anything
that was part of a general principle and was later singled out from the general
principle to teach [a specific piece of information], it is not to teach [this information]
only about itself that it was singled out, but to teach [this information] regarding
the entire general principle was it singled out.
The particular implied in the general and excepted from it for pedagogic
purposes elucidates the general as well as the particular.
The Torah writes,[17] Do not
kindle a fire in all your habitation on the Shabbat day. Now kindling is included in the general
category of work prohibited on Shabbat.
Why then is it singled out with its own verse? It is singled out in order to compare
the other to kindling, that just as when
one kindles on Shabbat unintentionally he must bring a sin offering as atonement for that one action,
so, if one performes several labors prohibited on Shabbat unintentionally, he is
required to bring a separate sin offering
for each and every one. Hence, the specific law teaches something with regard to
the general law.
In Devarim 22:1 we are told that the finder of lost property must return
it to its owner. In the next verse the Torah adds: “You shall do the same … with
his garment and with anything lost by
your brother… which you have found …”. Garment, though included in the general expression
“anything lost”, is specifically mentioned in order to indicate that the duty to
announce the finding of lost articles applies only to such objects which are likely
to have an owner, and which have, as in the case of clothing, some marks by which
they can be identified.
The Torah[18] forbids the eating
of sacrificial meat by anyone who is ritually
contaminated. The very next verse singles out the peace-offering, and states
that a contaminated person who eats of it is liable to keret, spiritual excision.
This principle teaches that the peace-offering is not an exception to the the general
rule; rather that the punishment specified for the peace-offering applies to all
offerings.
"A man, also, or a woman that devines that by a ghost or a familiar
spirit, shall surel be put to death; they shall stone them with stones"[19] Divination by a ghost or a familiar spirit is
included in the general rule against witchcraft.[20] Since the penalty in Vayikra 20:27 is stoneing
it may be inferred that the same penalty applies to other instasnces within the
same general rule.[21]
9. Anything
that was part of a general principle and was later singled out to discuss another
point similar to [the general principle] was singled out in order to be more lenient,
but not to be more stingent.
The particular implied in the general and excepted from it on account of
the special regulation which corresponds in concept to the general, is thus isolated
to decrease rather than to increase the rigidity of its application.
The Torah says[22] One who
kills a person shall be put to death. This verse would seem to mandate the death
penalty both for one who kills intentionally and also for one who kills unintentionally.
The Torah then writes (v.13) that if one kills another person unintentionally, he is not put to death;
rather, he is exiled to one of the cities of refuge (Devarim 19:5), One who kills
unintentionally is thereby singled out from the general principle of one who kills a person shall be put to death,
to indicate that his punishment is more lenient,
and he is not subject to death, merely
to exile.
In Shemot 35:2-3 we read: “Whoever does any work on the Sabbath shall be put to death; you shall not light a fire
on the Sabbath day”. The law against lighting a fire on
the Sabbath, though already implied in “any work”, is mentioned separately in order
to indicate that the penalty for lighting a fire on the Sabbath is not as drastic.
The law of the boil[23] and the burn[24] are treated specifically even though these are
specific instances of the general rule regarding plague spots.[25] Therefore the general restrictions regarding
the Law of the secod week[26] and the quick raw flesh[27] are not applied to them.[28]
10. Anything
that was part of a general principle and was later singled out to discuss another
point not similar to [the general principle] was singled out in order to be more
lenient as well as to be more stingent.
The particular implied in the general and excepted from it on account of
some other special regulation which does not correspond in concept to the general,
is thus isolated either to decrease or to increase the rigidity of its application.
The Torah[29] states a general rule that a Jewish servant gains his freedom after
six years of servitude. Later (v.7) the Torah singles out
a Jewish female servant and rules that
she does not go free as does a Jewish servant. On the
one hand, this gives the Jewish female servant a lenient rule, that unlike a male
servant, she gains her freedom upon reaching adulthood
(around the age of 12) or upon the death of the master. On the other hand, it gives
her also a stringent rule, for her master may marry
her if he so desires.[30]
According to Shemot 21:29-30, the proprietor of a vicious animal which has
killed a man or a woman must pay such compensation as may be imposed on him by the
court. In a succeeeding verse, the Torah adds: “If an ox goes a slave, male or female,
he must pay the master thirty shekels of silver”. The case of a slave, though already
included in pre preceding general law of the slain man or woman, contains a different
provision, the fixed amount of compensation,
with the result that whether the slave was valued at more than thirty shekels or
less than thirty shekels, the proprietor of the animal must invariably pay thirty
shekels.
The details on laws of plagues in the hair or beard[31] are dissimilar from those in the general rule
of plague spots. Therefore both the relaxation regarding the white hair mentioned
in the general rule[32] and the restriction of the yellow hair mentioned in the particular instance[33] are applied[34].
11. Anything
that was part of a general principle and was singled out to be considered in a new
matter, you cannot return it to its general principle unless Scripture returns it
explicitly to its general principle.
The particular implied in the general and excepted from it on account of
a new and reversed decision can be referred to the general only in case the passage
under consideration makes an explicit reference to it.
The Torah[35] permits anyone owned by, or born to a kohen (Priest),
and his immediate family to eat terumah (fruits or grains designated for a kohen). Hence a kohen’s daughter may eat terumah. However, should she marry a non-kohen,
she would be prohibited from eating terumah.
(The Torah removed her from the general principle.) Should her husband then die
or divorce her, she would be permitted to resume eating
terumah (if she has no children from him) only because the Torah returned her to
the category the daughter of a kohen,
and explicitly permitted her to do so.
The guilt-offering which a cured leper had to bring was unlike all other
guilt-offerings in this, that some of its blood was sprinkled on the person who
offered it.[36] On account of this peculiarity none of the rules
connected with other offerings would apply to that brought by a cured leper, had
not the Torah expressly added: “As the sin-offering so is the guilt-offering”.
The guilt offering of the leper requires the placing of the blood on the
ear, thumb, and toe.[37] Consequently, the laws
of the general guilt offering, such as the sprinkling of the blood on the alter[38] would not have applied, were it not for the Torah
passage: "For as the sin offering is the priest's so
is the guilt offereing",[39] i.e. that this is like other guilt offerings.[40]
12. A matter
derived from its context, or a matter derived from its end (i.e. from what follows
it).
Deduction from the context.
The Torah included You shall not steal
as one of the ten commandments. It is not clear, however,
whether this verse is a prohibition against stealing property or against stealing
a human being, i.e. kidnapping. The Sages derived from the context that it is a
prohibition against kidnapping, which is a capital offense, since the preceding,
and following, injunctions, You shall not
murder and you shall not commit adultery
are capital offenses.
The Torah first writes[41] no person
shal have relations with any relative. This verse implies that it is forbidden
to marry any relative, regardless of how
distant. The Torah then proceeds to list which relatives are forbidden in marriage,
indicating that one may marry any relatives that are not included in that list,
namely, the more distant relatives.
The noun tinshemeth occurs in
Vayikra 11:18 among the unclean birds, and again (verse 30) among the reptiles.
Hence, it becomes certain that tinshemeth
is the name of a certain bird as well as of a certain reptile.
In Devarim 19:6, with regard to the cities of refuge where the manslayer
is to flee, we read: “So that the avenger of blood may not pursue the manslayer
… and slay him, and he is not deserving of
death”. That the last clause refers to the slayer, and not to the blood avenger,
is made clear by the subsequent clause: “inasmuch as he hated him not in time past”.
"I put the plague of leporasy in a house of the land of your possesion",[42] refers only to a house built with stones, timber,
and mortar, since these materials are mentioned later in verse 45.
13. The resolution
of two verses that [seem] to contradict one another is that
a third verse will come and reconcile them.
When two Biblical passages contradict each other the contradiction in question
must be solved by reference to a third passage.
The Torah writes[43] In the
beginning God created the heavens
and the earth (see Rashi for the explanation of this verse). This verse implies
that the heavens were created before the earth. But later it writes[44] on the
day that God made earth and heavens, which implies that the earth was created
first. However, a third verse resolves the apparent contradiction by stating[45] (HaShem says:) Also my Hand founded the earth while my right hand formed the heavens,
indicating that the heavens and earth were created simultaneously.
In Shemot 13:6 we read: “Seven days you shall eat
unleavened bread”, and in Devarim 16:8 we are told: “Six
days you shall eat unleavened bread”. The contradiction between these two passages is explained by a reference to a third passage[46] where the use of the new produce is forbidden
until the second day of Passover. Hence, the passage
in Shemot 13:6 must refer to unleavened bread prepared of the produce of a previous
year.
After being commanded to remove Isaac from the
altar, Avraham asked HaShem to explain two contradictory
verses. First HaShem said that Isaac would be the forefather
of Israel[47] and then He commanded that Avraham to slaughter
him[48] HaShem explained that the wording of the command
was to place Isaac on the altar, but not
to slaughter him on it.[49] Thus, there is no contradiction.
Rules seven to eleven are formed by a subdivision of the fifth rule of Hillel;
rule twelve corresponds to the seventh rule of Hillel,
but is amplified in certain particulars; rule thirteen
does not occur in Hillel, while, on the other hand, the sixth rule of Hillel is
omitted by Ishmael.
* * *
The Bnei Yisaschar[50] explains that the thirteen middot of Rabbi Yishmael used to explain the Torah correspond to the 13 middot harachamim which we invoke when we recite selichot. Yet, these thirteen are not a single unit, but actually are divided into a group of twelve middot of chessed and one middah of din. The single middah of din, which is described by the name “K-l”, corresponds to the middah of kal v’chomer. The Talmud, in fact, uses the simple term “din” as a reference to kal v’chomer, e.g. the mishna in Bava Kamma uses the expression “dayo l’ba min HaDin”. Halachically, there is a fundamental difference that exists between kal v’chomer and all the other middot used to explain the Torah. Only kal v’chomer can be derived purely on the basis of sevara, logical inference, while all the other middot require a tradition handed down from one’s teacher. The greatest chessed in the world is HaShem giving of himself to us. The middot of rachamim cause HaShem to reveal more of his presence in the world, and correspondingly, the middot we use to explain the Torah reveal how much more of HaShem’s presence is with us that we see through a superficial reading of the Torah. Yet, even at a time of din when HaShem’s presence is hidden, we must trust that he is with us and seek him out; even when there is no mesorah and tradition to explain a text of Torah, we are free to use kal v’chomer to seek and find that meaning ourselves. ‘Piha pascha b’chachma’, explains the Bnei Yisaschar, refers to the middah of kal v’chomer which requires human intellect to reveal; ‘v’Torat chessed al leshona’ refers to the laws explicitly stated in the Torah which fall under the rubric of chessed.
This study was written by Hillel ben David
(Greg Killian).
Comments may be submitted to:
Greg Killian
7104 Inlay St SE
Lacey, WA 98513
Internet address: gkilli@aol.com
Web page: http://www.betemunah.org/
(360) 584-9352
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