Basic History of the Oral Law authority
Abel’s Sacrifice of higher quality than Cain's
Hakham Shaul Obeys The Oral Law
Rabbinic commentary on the Talmud.
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This paper
was written to show that the scripture assumes that there is an oral law, and that without the oral law, the scriptures are
incomplete.
The Jewish
Encyclopedia tells us that Rabbinic authority, the
ability to make oral law, was invested in men, and that this authority was
validated by Yeshua:
It is known that from the beginning of the third century
before the common era, rabbinical authorization by the patriarch consisted in
the bestowal of authority and power ("reshut") to teach, to judge, and to grant permission regarding
"the forbidden first-born among animals" ("yore yore, yadin
yadin, yattir bekorot," Sanh. 5a). But it is obvious that this is no
longer the original form of rabbinical authorization. Far more significant and
expressive of the idea of Rabbinical Authority are the words used by Yeshua when ordaining Peter as chief apostle,
or his disciples as his successors, and undoubtedly taken from pharisaic usage:
"I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven:
and whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven; and
whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven" (Matt.
xvi. 19, xviii. 18). This corresponds exactly with what Josephus, or rather his
source, tells of the Pharisees in the time of Queen
Alexandra: "They were the real administrators of the public affairs; they
removed and readmitted whom they pleased; they bound and loosed [things] at
their pleasure" ("B. J." i. 5, § 2). The terms "bind"
and "loose" ("asar we-hittir"), employed by the Rabbis in
their legal terminology, point indeed to a sort of supernatural power claimed
by the Pharisees for their prohibitory or permissory decrees, probably because
they could place both men and things under the ban, or "Cherem."
The greatest Torah scholars (Hakhamim) were empowered with the ability to apply the principles of Torah, both oral and written, and utilizing these principles as new cases presented themselves, or where confusion arose regarding existing law. Despite the attributes of the judges who possessed the combination of intellectual prowess with superior personal moral standards, the possibility of an error remained. In such cases the question would arise: Do the sages retain their authority in the event that they are mistaken?
The textual basis for the question revolves around the Torah statement:
Devarim
(Deuteronomy) 17:8-12 If there arises a matter too hard for you in
judgment, between blood and blood, between plea and plea, and between plague and plague, being matters of controversy inside
your gates, then shall you arise, and get to the place which HaShem your God shall choose. And you shall come to the priests the Levites, and to the judge who shall be in
those days, and inquire. And they shall declare to you the sentence of
judgment. And you shall do according to the sentence, which they of that place
which HaShem shall choose shall declare to you. And you shall take care to do
according to all that they inform you. According to the sentence of the Torah
which they shall teach you, and according to the
judgment which they shall tell you, you shall do; you shall not deviate from
the sentence which they shall declare to you, to the right hand, nor to the
left. And the man who will act presumptuously, and will not listen to the
priest who stands to minister there before HaShem your God, or to the judge,
that man shall die; and you shall put away the evil from Israel.
The same idea is found in the Midrash Shir HaShirim:
Midrash Rabbah
- The Song of Songs 1:18 You shall not turn aside from the sentence
which they shall declare to you to the right hand nor to the left. If they tell
you that the right hand is right and the left hand left, listen to them, and
even if they shall tell you that the right hand is left and the left hand
right.
This concept of absolute authority of the sages is quite disturbing especially in cases where is appears that they are mistaken. The Jerusalem Talmud records a dissenting opinion:
Yerushalmi
Horiot 2b Is it possible that if they told you right is left and
left is right you would have to listen to them? The verse teaches we must
follow [the sages] "left and right" only when they tell you right is
right, and left is left.
This approach is comforting, for the individual is not obligated to follow the sages astray, yet the normative law follows the approach of Rashi.
Rashi in the name of the Sifri: Even if they tell you that what you think is the right is really the left or visa versa, and it goes without saying that you must listen if they inform you that this is right and this is left [and you do not know otherwise].
Nachmanides elaborates: Even when you are convinced that they are in error, and the matter is as clear to you as the difference between your right hand and your left, do as they tell you. And do not say to yourself, "How can I eat this food when it is clearly fat [a forbidden substance], or how can I execute this clearly innocent person?" Rather say to yourself, "My Master who commanded me to observe His commandments, instructed me to observe them as the Hakhamim dictate."
Thus, according to this doctrine, we are commanded to follow what the Hakhamim tell us with blind faith, even if we know that what they are telling us is clearly wrong. But how can the Torah command us to do such a thing?
Nachmanides explains that the injunction to follow the rulings of the Sanhedrin (Hakhamim) even when it is clear to you that they are mistaken has no relation to blind faith. Mistaken or not, what the Sanhedrin (Hakhamim) decides determines the shape that the reality in the Torah adopts.
In passing, Nachmanides refers to a famous argument between two of the leading sages of the era of the Mishna. Rabbi Yehoshua and Raban Gamliel had arrived at different conclusions regarding the dates of Rosh HaShanah. This argument had serious ramifications including what day would be observed as the Day of Atonement – Yom HaKippurim:
Rosh Hashanah
25a Thereupon Rabban Gamaliel sent for him saying, "I enjoin
upon you to appear before me with your staff and your
money on the day which according to your reckoning should be the Day of
Atonement." ... He [Rabb Yehoshua] then went to Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas,
who said to him: "If we call in question [the decisions of] the House of
Rabban Gamaliel, we must call in question the decisions of every House of
Judgment which has existed since the days of Moses up to the present time. For it says, then went up Moses and Aaron, Nadab and
Abihu and seventy of the elders of
Nachmanides explains the perspective of Rabbi Yehoshua. Even though Rabbi Yehoshua knew that his position was correct, he accepted the court's decision.
One issue that is intriguing about this case is the fact that the Sanhedrin was no longer functioning. The Temple had been destroyed, and as the text had stated, now the court resided in Yavneh. This would explain the hesitation of Rabbi Yehoshua to acquiesce to the position of the court, and why he was not concerned with the label of "rebellious elder", whose punishment is death.
Now we understand the argument put forward by Rabbi Dosa. The rejection of this court in Yavneh is tantamount to the rejection of every court which has ever existed, it will produce the same result, religious anarchy.
I believe that one of the most telling arguments for the requirement of an oral law, other than the command of Torah, is the tradition that gives us the pronunciation of the words of the Torah.
The words written in a Torah scroll are written without any vowel markings.
This means that any word in the Torah has potentially many meanings, depending
on what vowels are applied to the consonants to form the sounds of the word. We
have a tradition which teaches us how the words are pronounced. This tradition, found in the oral law, defines the
meaning of each word in the Torah!
Thus, all the Christian and Jewish translations of the Torah rely on this tradition for their translations. Without this tradition it would be impossible to make a translation of the Torah. Without this tradition there would be anarchy in the translations and in the pronunciation of the words. Without this tradition it would be impossible to know what HaShem is telling us through His Torah.
Each word, in the Torah, can be read and made to mean almost anything, depending on the vowels one introduces. The first verse in chapter two of Genesis reads: “Thus the heavens and the earth were finished.” It can also be read as: “Thus the heavens and the earth were destroyed.” Thus we see that without an oral tradition to teach us the vowels and the sounds of the words, it would be impossible for us to understand their meaning.
* * *
What then
is the oral law, the words of our Hakhamim? The Encyclopedia Britannica will
give us some insights:
The Age Of The Tannaim (135-c. 200):
The making of the Mishna
Although the
promulgation of an official corpus represented a break with Rabbinic precedent,
Copyright (c) 1995 Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. All Rights Reserved
Our Sages teach us that each Hebrew letter has a particular meaning such that an unfamilar word can be understood by adding together the meanings of the letters. With this background it is instructive to note that the letters of the Mishna (vban) can be rearranged to form the word vnab (neshama which means soul). Thus we learn that the Mishna is the soul of the Written Torah. As the soul is intangible, so the Mishna is oral and intangible.
Mashiach is the written Torah, with the oral Torah being His soul. That is why it says that:
Yochanan (John) 1:1
In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was
with God, and the Word was God.
This is the
intangible part, the soul. The tangible part, the body
is defined in:
Yochanan (John) 1:14 And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us, (and we
beheld his glory, the glory as of the only begotten of the Father,) full of grace and truth.
The Mishna
is divided into six orders (sedarim), each order into
tractates (massekhtot), and each tractate into chapters (peraqim). The six
orders are: Zera'im, Mo'ed, Nashim, Neziqin,
Qodashim, and Tohorot
Zera'im ("Seeds") consists of eleven tractates: Berakhot, Peah, Demai, Kilayim,
Shevi'it, Terumot, Ma'aserot, Ma'aser
sheni, Halla, 'Orla, and Bikkurim. Except for Berakhot
("Blessings"), which treats of daily prayers
and grace, this order deals with laws related to
agriculture in